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ABSTRACT 
Many attacks on information systems occur when an adversary exploits wireless 
networking technology to remotely gain access to sensitive or confidential data housed 
within a targeted facility. Where such attack vectors exist, even the most stringent physical 
security safeguards can fail in preventing an attacker from executing a stand-off attack aimed 
at compromising facility systems. This class of attack, where the attacker remains positioned 
outside the physical confines of a facility and instead penetrates a network using a wireless 
vulnerability, is commonly referred to by security researchers as the “Parking Lot Attack”.  
In this work, we present a scheme deploying an integrated network of sensors 
intended to detect and geo-locate any wireless emitter attempting the Parking Lot Attack. A 
novel feature of our system is the use of monopulse radar methods to assign Line-of-Bearing 
estimates to any detected RF target. Our design provides for a series of cooperative, 
mechanically steered, detection sensors each employing a remotely controlled monopulse 
antenna array. Combining the Line-of-Bearing estimates obtained from multiple detection 
sensors supports the processing functionality required to geo-locate any RF station actively 
transmitting within range of our system.  
Our research program encompasses three facets, presented as separate chapters in this 
dissertation. We first describe our system design and architecture, and then we proceed into a 
quantitative study focused on analyzing the performance of a prototype detection sensor we 
developed to support field-operational experimentation. We also constructed a software 
model of our detection system, suitable for simulation studies. We describe how the 
simulation toolset can be utilized to answer questions about system deployment and 
operational strategy. 
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CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND AND DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
The topic of localization using radio frequency methods interests us from an 
information systems security viewpoint due to the enhanced situational awareness obtained 
when one is provided precise, geo-spatial location data for any broadcasting RF station 
operating within an established zone of interest. The zone of interest may be broad in 
geographic scope, such as tracking the location of a mobile device subscriber as they move 
about the area served by regional or national cellular infrastructure, or as in our specific focus 
of study, the area may be more geographically constrained, pertaining only to the coverage 
area within range of the wireless LAN (WLAN) environment of a facility. 
The WLAN environment is typically deployed to serve wireless stations operating 
internally, within the confines of the facility, but as we will show, the convenience of 
wireless accessibility has been repeatedly exploited by attackers as a means of gaining easy 
access to facility information systems. Security researchers use the term “Parking Lot 
Attack” to describe scenarios where an adversary recognizes wireless vulnerabilities that 
enable external remote access. The adversary then exploits those wireless vulnerabilities to 
gain access to the sensitive systems and data contained with the facility; this is often 
accomplished without the need to thwart any physical access controls setup to prevent 
unauthorized facility access.  
In this work we focus to either prevent or reliably detect when a Parking Lot Attack is 
carried out against a facility. We present our research into a system we developed using RF 
localization methods to detect emitters actively transmitting within the environment which is 
external to the facility we aim to defend against an adversary employing the Parking Lot 
Attack.  
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We begin Chapter 2 with a review of relevant and contemporary RF localization 
work, emphasizing wherever possible those systems intended specifically for security 
domain applications. We seek to compare and contrast the underlying methods presented in 
each example of past work with that of our own system. Following Chapter 2, we present 
research originally prepared as a series of papers, each focused on a related aspect of our 
study into Parking Lot Attack detection and methods for RF target spatial-attribution. These 
papers are currently in the peer review process at several refereed journals and conferences. 
In Chapter 3, we present the concept of operation, and architecture for our system 
designed to protect a facility from stand-off wireless attacks. We include a detailed threat 
model describing the facility attack surface and the capabilities and intentions of the 
adversary seeking to attack the facility protected by our system. Chapter 3 concludes with 
detailed discussion of a prototype detection sensor design which we constructed to perform 
real RF localization tests against wireless targets positioned on a surveyed field test range. A 
novel feature of our design is the use of monopulse radar methods to enhance the detection 
sensor Line-of-Bearing estimates collected by the sensor. Monopulse sensor readings support 
the positional spatial-attribution of detection targets using triangulation techniques; the more 
accurate the sensor reading, the more accurately the sensor position estimates become. The 
use of low-cost and commercially available hardware was also a design objective and 
something we touch on in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 is focused on the design and evaluation of a series of field experiments we 
conducted using the prototype detection sensor hardware we presented in Chapter 3. In our 
experiments we quantify detection sensor performance in terms of the boresight error, which 
was calculated using data collected by lobing an RF target positioned at a surveyed, pre-
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known location. We also present several software implemented digital signal processing 
(DSP) detectors and discuss the tradeoffs of these detectors in terms of the detection system 
error budget. Chapter 4 concludes with a detailed quantitative study of the sensor field 
performance and recommendations for future sensor design research and platform tools. 
In Chapter 5 we choose a more theoretical path, exploring questions focused around 
determining the best strategy for effectively deploying and operating the network of detection 
sensors we designed for the protection of a facility from the Parking Lot Attack. To study 
these strategy questions, we developed a simulation tool capable of performing many 
iterations of randomized attack and defend scenarios. We first present several core strategy 
questions and then detail a series of simulation experiments which were performed to 
quantitatively assess our performance questions. The simulations permitted us to more fully 
explore our system in terms of scalability and true detection network performance. Since we 
only constructed a single instance of our prototype detection sensor for field research, 
simulations were a logical choice for exploring how a cooperative network deploying 
multiple sensors could realistically perform in a simulated hostile threat environment.  
Chapter 6 summarizes the important findings of our research. In addition, we feel that 
we have uncovered many more questions than answers in our research, so we conclude this 
work by making recommendations for further study of the research problems we feel are still 
important topics for study in this domain. 
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CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 
Prior art played an important role in laying the foundation for our research effort. The 
topic of localization using RF technologies is nearly as old as the subject of radio itself. 
Marconi described to the IEEE society in 1922 how, years earlier, he observed radio waves 
reflecting from objects in the environment and how he believed that such phenomena could 
aide in guiding ships at sea through foggy conditions [1]. It was not long after the advances 
of Marconi that the British “Chain Home” system of radio direction finding, led by Robert 
Watson-Watt, was fielded to protect United Kingdom airspace from hostile aircraft during 
World War II [2] [3].  
While our research program borrows methods and techniques from the radar 
literature, the system we have developed fits better in the localization category of RF 
triangulation. This is primarily because our system lacks the target ranging capability 
inherent to any modern radar system. However, our system does employ monopulse radar 
methods to improve the accuracy of a Line-Of-Bearing (LOB) estimate calculated for any 
detected RF target. Excellent primers on the topic of monopulse radar can be found in [4], 
[5], [6].  
It is the combination of multiple LOB estimates collected from spatially separated 
sensors in our system that enables triangulation to occur. For once two or more devices have 
estimated the LOB to a target, the LOB lines may be geometrically intersected to calculate a 
position point. In practice, LOB lines are better represented as polygons, due to estimation 
errors inherent to our detection system, and the position point is better characterized as a 
probable region of signal origination, falling within the geometric region where the LOB 
polygons intersect. We will explore this in much more detail in subsequent chapters.  
5 
 
Since the pioneering work of Marconi and the technologies inspired by Watson-Watt 
and others, there have been countless developments in the domain of RF localization, with 
topics ranging from those focused on military and defense, commercial applications of 
location-based services, and those serving utility functions such as personnel, asset, and 
inventory tracking. The entire field of study concerning wireless position estimation can best 
be described as extremely broad; for the purposes of providing the necessary backdrop 
contextualizing our research, we have elected to focus on those radio-location systems 
supporting an intrusion detection or information security feature set. A thorough technical 
treatment of the many types of localization schemes pertaining to security and electronic 
warfare models can be found in [7].  
We can further subdivide security and intrusion detection oriented systems into those 
systems which operate using directional antennas, which are similar in architecture to our 
own detection and localization system, and those systems which employ other triangulation 
methods, such as Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) and RF propagation path modeling 
based on Received Signal Strength (RSS). Our own system, using directional antennas would 
best be classified as an Angle of Arrival (AoA) system.  
Localization Systems Employing RSS and TDOA Methods 
There are excellent commercial and research examples of localization systems 
employing RSS mapping for device tracking [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. These systems feature 
solid indoor performance with accuracy potential to within a few meters in indoor 
environments. While most systems in this category were designed for indoor operation, a 
University of Washington study did report attempting the method outdoors [10]. The 
drawback of these systems is the costly setup time and the periodic re-sampling required for 
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maintaining system accuracy. This is because most examples are not zero knowledge 
systems, instead the functionality relies on the creation of a database of signal propagation 
characteristics requiring potentially thousands of empirically collected sample points to 
accurately model the path traveled by wireless signals within the service set domain. 
Although, at least one system, RADAR from Microsoft Research reported an attempt to 
reduce the setup time required by these systems using sophisticated signal propagation 
modeling [8].  
Localization using the RSS and propagation modeling approach has matured to the 
point where many product offerings are available which feature the technique. A typical 
example for personnel and inventory tracking can be found in Cisco’s Wireless Location 
Appliance [9]. This system advertises the capability to track the location of thousands of 
wireless 802.11 devices within a service set domain. There are security features bundled into 
this product, a white-list of allowed devices can be maintained, so that unauthorized devices 
can be flagged and located based on a signal fingerprint lookup found in the signal 
propagation database. A changing propagation environment will necessitate the need for 
periodic resampling to occur in order to maintain the accuracy of the signal propagation 
model. Comparable commercial systems are presented in [11] and [12].  
From a security context, a key drawback of systems employing RSS was the host-
based orientation of the localization method. Hosts utilize a priori signal propagation data for 
the transmit/receive characteristics of WLAN Access Points operating in the environment to 
estimate their position. This is because it is simpler to collect samples for a small group of 
access points with known signal transmit power levels, than to collect propagation samples 
for each individual device operating within the WLAN environment. Propagation models 
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depend on knowing the transmit power, and the received signal strength to estimate device 
location. Ultimately, localization then depends on the subscribing hosts being cooperative in 
sharing their estimated position to the central network, something that is obviously not likely 
to occur in the context of an enemy perpetrating a wireless intrusion.  
The most notable example of using TDOA for position estimation would be the 
Global Positioning System (GPS). Systems using TDOA use the known locations of a 
network of stationary reference stations, along with a precisely synchronized distributed 
clock, to measure the time it takes for a signal originating at a reference station to arrive at 
the receiving device. Multiple readings received from different reference stations can then be 
aggregated to triangulate position. The nature of the timing and measurement methods make 
these systems more complex to implement. They also suffer from the same host-based 
limitations we just described as being inherent to methods using RSS, making them of little 
use to a security or intrusion detection system. The system is again dependent on an enemy 
being cooperative in broadcasting her calculated position estimates. Nevertheless, TDOA is 
an important technology to understand when contextualizing the system we have developed 
in our research.  
Most TDOA examples in the research literature attempt to use Access Point 
infrastructure that has been modified for accurate timing measurements to duplicate GPS 
functionality in indoor environments. A by no means exhaustive grouping of TDOA research 
studies using WLAN access points for both indoor and outdoor localization can be found in 
[13], [14], [15], [16]. 
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Localization Systems Using Directional Antenna Methods for Intrusion Detection 
Systems using directional antennas feature less synchronization and timing 
complexity than more sophisticated TDOA methods, and require much less setup time when 
compared to the empirical propagation modeling methods used in RSS location schemes. 
Directional antenna methods provide the capability to setup and operate in an environment 
with zero knowledge of the RF landscape. This capability is critical to the security context of 
our research, as these systems represent a class of functionality in direct contrast to the 
methods we have previously reviewed: host-based cooperation is not required for positional 
estimates to be made. This permits directional antenna systems to potentially detect and 
locate the uncooperative adversary. These systems are however much more susceptible to 
multipath fading and interference making them better suited for outdoor environments. 
However, at least one system, a University of Illinois study, employed outdoor directional 
antennas for location tracking indoors [17]. The system we present does indeed leverage this 
better suitability for outdoor or clear line-of-sight requirements, by deploying directional 
antenna-based detection sensors externally, on the facility perimeter, with outward facing 
orientations. 
A paper published by researchers at the University of New Orleans is the standout 
example of a system with direct security and intrusion detection context [18]. In this paper 
the authors demonstrate the use of a high-gain antenna system for active transmitter 
localization. The authors combine an anomaly and signature-based Wireless Intrusion 
Detection System (WIDS) with the several types of high-gain antennas to locate a wireless 
intruder.  
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The University of New Orleans study concludes by repeating the utility of directional 
dish antennas as a means of accurately measuring the angular bearing of a receiver to a 
transmitter. The authors also mention their intended next step is motorizing the directional 
antenna for automated tracking of a transmitter. They mention that a drawback of this 
approach is that only active transmissions are detected. A passive eavesdropper cannot be 
located with directional-antenna based location methods. 
Our conceptual design builds upon systems like that presented by University of New 
Orleans and utilizes a steerable directional antenna to attempt emitter triangulation using line 
of bearing estimation. Conceptually, our emitter spatial attribution system is composed of a 
distributed network of steerable high-gain antennas. Antenna angular direction is controlled 
automatically using a positioning motor. Directional heading is also sensed so that a scan 
bearing can be measured and reported.  
One unique aspect of our system is that our design provides for the interoperation of 
multiple sensors in a cooperative manner. In this scheme, a spatially distributed network of 
independently scanning sensors would communicate and share collected LOB data using a 
wired distribution system, operated out-of-band from the wireless domain under protection. 
Sensors would communicate calculated LOB vectors along with GPS location coordinates to 
a command and control sub-system using the distribution system. Command and control 
would fuse disparate sensor LOB measurements to perform emitter triangulation calculations 
and direct future sensor scanning movements for dynamic tracking of emitters.  
We found a scheme very similar to our design in use in a University of Greenwich led 
localization study [19], where a mobile rover operating a mechanically steered directional 
antenna was used to probe an environment for the location of operating WLAN Access 
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Points. Similar to our own system, the application was intended for outdoor deployment and 
operation. The location of the rover was tracked and maintained using GPS, enabling the 
mobile sensor to perform triangulations using a database created by the sensor as it moved 
through and about an environment. Unlike our system, this scheme did not utilize an antenna 
array, whereas our system seeks to enhance LOB angular estimates by applying monopulse 
radar techniques enabled by the use of an antenna array. Key finding of the University of 
Greenwich study were that higher gain antennas were needed to increase accuracy and the 
ability to detect targets operating more than 50 meters from the collection sensor. Our system 
employs 16dBi high-gain antennas to counter just such a limitation. A system nearly identical 
to the University of Greenwich system is described in [20].  
Directly related to the prior research and again featuring similar directional antenna 
functionality was a Plymouth University study focused on discovering hidden WLAN 
enabled mobile devices [21]. This study featured a hand-held device with a high-gain 
antenna. The operator manually panned the antenna while watching signal strength readings 
filtered to only show reading for the network MAC address of the device being targeted. 
Again, this device only used a single antenna, and required the operator to actively engage in 
seeking the target. Our system instead focuses on passive monitoring methods, with operator 
notification only in the event of unauthorized detection. The Plymouth University system 
could be a useful tool to employ in combination with our own system, where the hand-held 
scanning system is used to very precisely sweep an area where our detection system 
estimates that a wireless attack is originating from.  
We found very few examples employing monopulse radar antenna arrays in the 2.4 
GHz spectrum band. One example was found using monopulse methods to track RFID tags 
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in the retail store setting [22]. No examples were found using monopulse methods for WLAN 
intrusion detection, which is the basis for our system of detecting unauthorized WLAN 
intrusions. We now turn to a detailed study of our detection system architecture, 
functionality, and theoretical performance. 
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DETECTION SYSTEM EMPLOYING MONOPULSE RADAR METHODS TO 
DETECT AND SPATIALLY ATTRIBUTE RF TARGETS IN THE 2.4 GHZ ISM 
BAND  
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Abstract 
Many attacks on information systems occur when an adversary exploits wireless 
networking technology to remotely gain access to sensitive or confidential data within a 
targeted facility. Where such attack vectors exist, even the most stringent physical 
security safeguards can fail in preventing an attacker from executing a stand-off attack 
aimed at compromising facility systems. This class of attack, where the attacker remains 
positioned outside the physical confines of a facility and instead penetrates a network 
using a wireless vulnerability, is commonly referred to by security researchers as the 
“Parking Lot Attack.” In this work, we present a scheme deploying an integrated network 
of sensors intended to detect and geo-locate any wireless emitter attempting the Parking 
Lot Attack. We first introduce the context for such a system by presenting a threat model 
describing the facility and data systems targeted for attack. Specific vulnerabilities in the 
attack surface of our model, which make the Parking Lot Attack a viable and preferred 
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Engineering, Iowa State University. 
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exploitation vector, are explained. We describe the motivations and capabilities of the 
adversary employing this attack, and provide a constrained, but realistic Parking Lot 
Attack scenario which drives our detection system design. A novel feature of our system 
is the use of monopulse radar methods to assign Line-of-Bearing estimates to a detected 
RF target. We cover a concept of operation and propose a deployment scheme for facility 
protection using our system. We then discuss in detail the design and architecture of a 
second generation sensor implementation; a device which we constructed to perform real 
operational experiments. We conclude with a brief demonstration of several key detection 
and sensing features of the device, saving more in-depth treatment for a planned follow 
on paper focused on quantitatively analyzing the performance of our system.  
Background and Research Context 
The home, business, appliance, and automobile are ever increasingly connected 
using radio frequency technologies. As one example, consider the broad range of devices 
that operate in just the license-free Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) RF bands. 
From a cyber-security perspective, these wireless communications platforms present an 
adversary an attack surface that is much more accessible – and hence much more 
vulnerable – than their hard-wired counterparts.  
Vast amounts of time and resources are expended securing wireless protocol 
stacks from eavesdropping and unauthorized access. However, high-profile and costly 
attacks against wireless networks still persist [1] [2]. These attacks permit a stand-off 
adversary remote access to sensitive systems and data that would be more easily secured 
had system communications avoided the use of wireless technologies altogether. To 
counter this threat, monitoring agents serve alongside other underlying information 
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assurance mechanisms to provide tactical threat intelligence and situational awareness 
with the aim of ensuring that system integrity is maintained and that the system remains 
available. Monitoring of wireless – or any network communications traffic – is a mature 
discipline with many useful systems and tools supporting features such as load balancing 
and performance measurement, in addition to the detection of misuse and anomalous 
network communications.  
Spatial Attribution in Wireless Network Monitoring Systems 
Spatial attribution of wireless devices and RF activity within a secured 
environment is a more recent addition to these monitoring tools, and remains an 
interesting area of exploration for wireless security researchers. Monitoring systems 
capable of spatial attribution are being developed with the intent of extending device 
position information to traditional monitoring applications, thus augmenting traditional 
situational awareness capabilities with the locations of wireless devices interacting with 
the WLAN environment of a facility. Commercial and research systems for indoor spatial 
attribution of wireless devices are shown here [3] [4] [5]. 
Indoor environments in modern office structures are filled with the metallic 
materials that wreak havoc on radio frequency transmissions. This complicates the spatial 
attribution problem for systems seeking to track and geo-locate RF devices operating 
inside a structure. Studs internal to walls, building elevator shafts, heating and ventilation 
systems, and miles of cabling all contribute to signal multi-path reflections causing 
fading, cancellation, and other forms of RF propagation jitter. These non-linear effects 
markedly impact how systems for indoor wireless device spatial attribution are designed 
and function. Many of these systems, which behave like and resemble wireless LAN 
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access points, operate using pre-configured, static maps of the wireless environment 
inside a facility [3], [5]. These maps are developed while moving a target device with a 
known position and RF signature about a facility during a physical audit phase of the 
system deployment.  
Statement of Research Objective 
One limitation inherent to these systems is their indoor-oriented focus towards the 
RF environment internal to the facility where they are deployed. They do not monitor or 
attempt to spatially attribute devices connecting to internal wireless networks from 
outside the facility. However, one common attack vector found on the attack surface of 
wireless networks is the compromise of the sensitive systems and data of a facility by an 
adversary positioned outside the physical confines of the facility; an attack commonly 
referred to in literature as the “Parking Lot Attack” [6], or PLA for short.  
 Our objective is to research systems and methods designed to detect an 
adversary employing the Parking Lot Attack as the primary penetration vector 
during a Wireless LAN incursion.  
As previously stated, an adversary using the Parking Lot Attack vector is located 
off-premises, not actually physically present within a facility targeted for malicious 
penetration. If our aim is to detect the PLA, a critical facet of our research should then 
focus on the problem of detecting and spatially attributing RF devices operating external 
to the physical confines of a facility of interest. For if we know that a wireless device is 
located outside a facility, and that this device is attempting communications with a 
network internal to the facility, we can then alert security personnel who can investigate 
whether this is malicious or unauthorized behavior. The focus on attacks originating 
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external to a facility presents a different RF environment than that of the detection and 
monitoring schemes described above for indoor applications.  
However, we feel that looking outward for an attack originating external to the 
facility perimeter provides us with advantages in terms of more well-behaved RF 
emissions, relative to the indoor environment. The outdoor environment surrounding a 
facility we wish to protect from external attack can be conditioned much more easily for 
RF sensing. Sensor locations can be selected such that clear lines-of-sight mitigating 
multipath reflections can be obtained about the perimeter, allowing more accurate angle 
sensing of RF targets operating nearby. In other words, the dense undergrowth of metallic 
obstructions present in the facility interior is removed from the equation. Due to this, the 
system of sensors we discuss and have deployed for our research is designed and 
functions differently than those systems previously mentioned for indoor spatial 
attribution. One benefit of this shift in design focus is that our system for monitoring the 
external environment of a facility does not require previous RF environmental mapping. 
In terms of form and function, our system resembles much more a radar installation than 
the wireless router add-on systems we described for interior deployments.  
 The electronic toolset requirements for the detection and location of RF 
devices external to a facility differ from the toolset required for interior 
facility monitoring.  
 This can be attributed to an external RF propagation environment featuring a 
more open electromagnetic landscape that can be conditioned for clear lines-
of-sight. Clear lines-of-sight support accurate detection sensing. 
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Enhancing RF Situational Awareness to Counter the Parking Lot Attack 
It is our premise that accurate and precise wireless device spatial attribution 
would enable virtual exclusion zones to be configured that monitor wireless activity 
external to a facility. We define an RF Exclusion Red Zone, or just Red Zone for short, as 
a zone where wireless activity, when detected within the zone perimeter, would be 
classified as potentially malicious, and in need of further investigation. As an example, a 
threat analyst could direct counter-measures towards an adversary attempting to execute 
the Parking Lot Attack against a facility defended by this capability. The system could 
detect an emitter transmitting in an unauthorized zone, and notify the threat analyst so 
that an attack disposition can be determined and a suitable defensive posture taken. 
WIDAR – Wireless Intrusion Detection and Ranging 
Our research goes beyond a purely theoretical design as we present a second-
generation implementation of our system concept, in the form of a network of sensors 
which we call WIDAR – short for Wireless Intrusion Detection and Ranging. Before we 
delve into the details of our implementation design and architecture, we first cover the 
threat model which conceptually defines the theoretical facility we wish to protect from 
the Parking Lot Attack, as well as the capabilities of the ever-persistent and diabolically-
evil Adversary; whose aim is to steal the sensitive data stored in the information systems 
maintained within this facility.  
We then detail specific system architecture and device capabilities and at the same 
time offer our motivation for development decisions which were made during system 
design and implementation. Since the focus of the second part of this work is on a real 
implementation constructed for real system experiments, we also include many diagrams 
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and photos of our system detection sensor, as constructed, along with screen captures of 
system control and analysis software. Whenever appropriate, we also include 
presentations of data collected from ongoing preliminary bench testing of our device, 
saving a full analytical review for a forthcoming paper focused around quantitative 
experiments analyzing device spatial attribution outputs when operated against RF targets 
with known position.  
Threat Model and Adversary Capabilities 
The threat model sets the stage for experiments and analysis of scenarios where 
the Parking Lot Attack is the primary vector chosen by an adversary. The location, 
technology, and methods selected for the attack directly drive the design and 
implementation of our system for detecting and countering the PLA. It is important to 
discuss in detail the physical environment and technological circumstances that lead an 
attacker to choose the PLA as the best option for successful compromise. While defining 
the threat landscape we will, at the same time, place some presumptive constraints on our 
model that we feel are necessary to maintain focus on the wireless attack vector. By 
applying such rigid constraints, we can eliminate the need to consider parallel threats as 
part of this research, allowing for a more controlled study of the Park Lot vector and its 
detection. 
We divide the system threat model into two categories:  
 A description of the facility protected by our system, which we call the 
Facility Under Protection. 
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 A description of the motivation and technical capabilities of the theoretical 
Adversary, who seeks to carry out offensive information operations against 
the wireless attack surface of our model facility. 
The Facility Under Protection 
The Facility Under Protection (FUP), along with the threat model for it, both 
serve to contextualize our research focus, which is to detect and geo-locate an attacker 
carrying out the Parking Lot Attack. We use the term Under Protection to indicate that 
the facility is being guarded by our system; a system composed of a network of sensors 
designed to protect against external wireless attacks. A diagram illustrating the FUP 
model is shown in Figure 3.1.  
In our model, size and physical layout of the facility and its internal floor plan are 
not critical parameters. Instead, the key takeaway is that this facility houses secured 
information systems hosting sensitive systems and data. For scenario realism, imagine 
that these systems stage and process information considered vital to the security of a 
nation, or databases storing the personally identifying and financial transactions of 
customers doing business with a large corporation. 
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Figure 3.1. Model of Facility Under Protection. A wireless access point inside the facility presents a 
vulnerability permitting external attacks on the sensitive systems and data contained within the seemingly 
secure facility. The Access Point may or may not connect directly to the sensitive systems and data, instead 
our model assumes that, once internal LAN access is obtained by the Adversary, a mix of stepping stone 
and privilege escalation attacks can provide a path to the sensitive systems and data. In our model, an attack 
originating from the Facility Grounds is the preferred exploitation vector of choice for our Adversary. 
We assume that the facility has been hardened against physical attack and 
penetration in some manner, thus making attack vectors executed against wireless 
infrastructure a more tempting and preferred avenue of compromise. While there are a 
multitude of wireless vulnerabilities that may be discussed in the context of the attack 
surface of our model facility, only one is germane to our research:  
 Some segment of the data communications network operated within our 
model facility has – intentionally or un-intentionally – a remotely accessible 
Wireless Access Point. Given the multitude of reported real world PLA 
examples, this should not be an entirely unbelievable premise.  
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Lastly, although it is conceivable that wireless attacks could just as easily be 
executed from a location internal to the FUP, we wish to constrain our attack scenario 
even further by adding that an internally originating wireless attack is not a preferred 
attack vector. In our model, this is made true by the one reason we already mentioned: 
strict physical access controls. Physical access to the facility is authenticated, and perhaps 
entrants are also subject to search, or, as can be commonly seen in highly secure 
facilities, wireless devices are banned from the facility altogether. The main point we 
want to make is that for an inside attack to be carried out, the risk of an attacker being 
detected while executing an internally launched attack is orders of magnitude greater than 
the risk outwardly presented by the Parking Lot Attack vector. We say outwardly 
presented, because our model assumes that an adversary is not aware of the counter-
measures our system deploys at the facility to detect and thwart PLA attempts.  
 In our Threat Model, the FUP is MOST vulnerable to an adversary executing 
the Parking Lot Attack. 
This leaves the remote or stand-off attack as the path of least resistance for an 
attacker wishing to penetrate the sensitive systems and data of the FUP. In Figure 3.1 we 
define the region external to the facility interior as the Facility Grounds. In most real 
world examples, the grounds will contain some type of parking area for employees and 
visitor access to the facility.  
 The Facility Grounds serve as the launch pad for the Parking Lot Attack.  
The Wireless Access Point and Theoretical Vulnerabilities 
Even though it can be assumed that connections to the FUP wireless access point 
are authenticated and encrypted, in our threat model the use of authentication and 
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encryption mechanisms do not entirely mitigate the remotely executed threats directed at 
the FUP. There are many examples of attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in provably 
secure – at least provable in the mathematical sense – wireless networking systems [7] [8] 
[9] [10]. In, other words, our threat model contains vulnerabilities that mainly exist due to 
flaws in engineering and implementation, not necessarily for design reasons. These are 
the domain of buffer and heap-overflows, integer off-by-one’s, race-conditions, and 
statistical attacks; exploitable implementation flaws employed by attackers as attack 
vectors against software targets. 
Adversary Capabilities—Carrying Out the Parking Lot Attack  
The Adversary in our threat model is both determined to gain access to the 
sensitive systems and data housed in the secured Facility, and she has the skills and 
expertise required to reach this objective. The Adversary is a cautious and capable 
planner, and we should assume that a combination of offsite and onsite pre-attack 
reconnaissance, obtained through careful surveillance, has led the Adversary to discover 
the Wireless Access Point in use at the FUP. Furthermore, the hardened nature of the 
physical security at the FUP was also discovered as part of the same comprehensive and 
sophisticated pre-attack preparation. Knowledge of these environmental conditions has 
led her to make the determination that the best avenue of attack is to overtly or covertly 
enter the facility grounds, either on foot or in a vehicle, in order to stealthily launch her 
wireless offensive from a location external to the facility structure itself.  
 The determined and well prepared Adversary is going to discover and exploit 
the FUP vulnerability presented by the Wireless Access Point.  
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 The FUP is in need of a system that can detect the Parking Lot Attack so that 
counter-measures can be directed against the Adversary. 
Fingerprinting of services and passive monitoring of RF activity near the FUP has 
provided her with a multitude of intelligence assisting her offensive. We should assume 
that this intelligence is sufficient to enable the Adversary to develop and dry-run a series 
of attack scenarios. The result of this careful planning culminates in several full-dress 
rehearsals, each resulting in full compromise of a simulation environment mimicking the 
targeted FUP Sensitive Systems and Data. The electronic battle plan for the attack is 
entirely predicated on the external access afforded by the FUP Wireless Access Point.  
 The Wireless Access Point is the crack in the armor of the FUP, and our 
Adversary is prepared, and is confident that her attack will succeed. 
We show our attacker executing the Parking Lot Attack in Figure 3.2. We should 
note that the Adversary is sophisticated and experienced enough to know that she cannot 
simply drive up, find a parking location, and pull out a laptop computer and begin 
working while sitting behind the wheel. She will most likely employ camouflaging 
methods that hide the fact that her attack is being executed. We mention this to make the 
point that any detection scheme we design to detect and thwart the Parking Lot Attack 
should not rely exclusively upon visual detection of the Adversary in the act of carrying 
out the Parking Lot Attack – using, for example, security or close-circuit television 
cameras. Instead a detection scheme should rely on sensors operating in the PHY and 
DATA LINK layers to detect any cyber-assault.  
25 
 
 
Figure 3.2. The Adversary executes the Parking Lot Attack. A wireless access point inside the facility is 
permitting an attacker, who is on the Facility Grounds but has not physically entered the hardened Facility 
interior, to gain access to Sensitive Systems and Data. 
It is unimportant whether the sensitive systems and data are actually directly 
accessible via the wireless local area network upon a successful PLA launched wireless 
compromise. Rather, our threat model simply assumes that there exist other 
vulnerabilities permitting stepping stone and privilege escalation attacks using a variety 
of means, once wireless entry is achieved.  
System Conceptual Overview and Operational Strategy 
We next conceptually describe the system conceptual model, and the constituent 
components of this model. We then describe how components are deployed in and about 
the FUP perimeter to scan for and detect any RF emitters operating within the pre-
designated boundary of a sensor scan zone. We also detail how sensor components are 
connected via a distribution system enabling communications, and the manner by which 
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sensor data are aggregated. All devices are administered via a centralized command and 
control system utilizing this same distribution system. 
The RF Exclusion Red Zone 
The components interoperate as part of an integrated system designed to detect 
and assign a spatial location to any RF target operating within a pre-designated RF 
exclusion area, which we call a “Red Zone”. The Red Zone must be pre-defined, 
following system deployment, by a Threat Analyst as a region on the facility grounds 
where RF activity is unauthorized and where RF activity, if detected, triggers an alert. 
The Threat Analyst can then make a determination whether or not an actual attack is 
occurring and whether to deploy countermeasures.  
In our system conceptual model, we designate the entire facility grounds, external 
to the FUP as the RF Exclusion Red Zone. Figure 3.3 illustrates the RF Exclusion Red 
Zone, in the context of our FUP model. 
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Figure 3.3. The RF Exclusion Red Zone about the Facility Under Protection Perimeter. In our model we 
designate All Space exterior to the Facility Under Protection as Red Zone. Any unauthorized RF emitter 
operating in this Red Zone will cause an alert to be issued to an on duty Threat Analyst. 
The System Sensor 
The system components which are most mission-critical to our model facility 
attack detection system are the devices for detecting and spatially tracking wireless 
intrusion attempts at the facility perimeter. Indeed the entire premise of our system, 
monitoring RF Exclusion Red Zones, is predicated upon the existence of some capability 
to accurately detect and spatially attribute RF targets operating in the vicinity of the FUP. 
Since our system is called WIDAR (Wireless Intrusion Detection and Ranging), the 
devices deployed about the facility edge to detect intrusions are called WIDAR devices, 
WIDAR sensors, or simply “detection sensors” throughout the remainder of this paper.  
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In our system design, it is critical that a sensor in our model be capable of 
producing the following detection outputs: 
 Line-of-Bearing estimate (from detection sensor boresight) for any active 
targets falling within the detection array beam pattern. 
 Azimuthal Heading estimate indicating the angular bearing of the detection 
sensor array. 
These two detection outputs: the sensor being able to estimate angle of arrival, 
and the sensor tracking which direction it is scanning when an angle of arrival is 
estimated, drive the entire design of the system detection sensor. Two entire sub-systems 
of our device are dedicated to creating and managing these critical detection attributes. 
These sub-systems are described in detail in this work. 
Sensor Deployment Scheme for the Facility Under Protection 
The sensors in our system are deployed about the Facility Grounds such that the 
data from multiple sensor scans provide an overlapping coverage of RF activity. In 
practice, the extents and geometry of this overlapping coverage form the boundaries of 
the RF Exclusion Red Zone depicted in Figure 3.3. A hypothetical sensor deployment 
scheme is shown in Figure 3.4, where sensors are deployed at intervals on the exterior 
surface of the FUP. In a real implementation, sensors would be deployed on a building 
rooftop or on utility poles providing clear line-of-sight views of the grounds surrounding 
a facility. For an in-depth treatment of our recommended strategy for sensor deployment 
and system operation guidelines developed from extensive simulation runs, see our 
companion work [11].  
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Figure 3.4. Detection Sensors Deployed on Facility Under Protection. The Detection Sensors can rotate 360 
degrees to scan the RF environment external to the Facility Under Protection. The Scan Patterns of the 
Sensors have overlapping Fields of View. The locations of each sensor are known to the WIDAR 
Command and Control System. 
Sensors are Mechanically Steered 
The rightmost pair of sensors in Figure 3.4 illustrates how the sense patterns in our 
system should be arranged such that coverage overlaps to support the Red Zone 
designation capability of our system. Our present implementation features sensors 
operating mechanically steered antenna arrays. Each sensor is capable of continuous 360º 
rotation, with this rotational functionality also shown in Figure 3.4. In our prototype 
sensor implementation, continuous rotation is achieved through the use of a slip-ring 
connector joining the upper antenna chassis to the lower mechanical rotation assembly. 
Furthermore, a magnetic rotary encoder on each sensor is able to accurately track the 
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current azimuthal heading of the detection sensor, in the form of an angular bearing 
output. Each sensor periodically communicates current bearing data to a centralized 
Command and Control system – described in detail in a following section. 
Sensor Movements are Camouflaged 
In our design, deployed sensors are fitted with radome covers offering protection 
from the harshness of exposure to an outdoor environment, along with a degree of 
camouflage. By employing camouflage, we seek to obscure system capabilities and 
defensive posture by hiding whether a sensor is actively scanning, and therefore not 
revealing the exact directional bearing towards which the sensor array is currently 
scanning. By doing so, we seek to make using evasive physical counter-measures against 
our detection system more difficult for the adversary. An example of an evasive physical 
counter-measure would be an adversary conducting wireless communications only when 
she knows that a detection sensor is not actively oriented towards her position. 
Detecting the Parking Lot Attack 
Each detection sensor is capable of sensing RF activity within its area of control, 
and each device can sense and calculate an estimated Line-Of-Bearing (LOB) for any 
active RF emitters operating within range of the sensitivity limits of the device. A device 
accomplishes LOB detection using a mechanically steered antenna array, which is rotated 
through a scan pattern in search of anomalous RF signals. The scan capabilities and the 
RF sensing outputs from the antenna array attached to each device are described in detail 
later in this work.  
Figure 3.5 illustrates two sensors in the process of detecting the Adversary as she 
executes the PLA. Unbeknownst to the Adversary, her active attack has been detected by 
31 
 
two independently scanning sensors tasked with protecting the facility. Each sensor is 
calculating and maintaining a lock on the LOB to the position of the RF device operated 
by the Adversary. The individual LOB estimates are being communicated to the 
Command and Control system where these data are integrated, resulting in a position fix 
estimate being made available to an on-duty Threat Analyst. 
 
Figure 3.5. Sensors Detecting an Attack Attempt. Line-of-bearing data from two or more sensor angle 
estimates are integrated by a centralized Command and Control yielding a position estimate. System spatial 
attributes in turn feed functionality in higher-level Monitoring Systems such as a Red-Zone Intrusion 
Detection System which, when triggered, can direct a response team or activate other counter-measures.  
Active Versus Passive Attack Detection 
At this point, a distinction should be made regarding active versus passive attack 
detection. Our system of sensors detects only active RF targets operating within the beam 
pattern of the high gain antenna array deployed on each sensor, and as such, our system 
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does not have the capability to detect an Adversary who is only passively capturing RF 
traffic. For the purposes of this research, while many attacks originate using passive 
methods, we stipulate that the most damaging attacks will progress to some sort of active 
operations [12], and we assert that in order for our Adversary to really “get the goods” – 
reaching the sensitive systems and data of the FUP – she will need to switch to an active 
attack mode.  
 Attacks which extract the most value from a target will require active RF 
emissions due to the need to utilize networking protocols with handshaking 
between target and attack hosts.  
We feel this is a realistic requirement as many attack scenarios will require some 
usage of a connection oriented TCP/IP protocol based network service in order for an 
attack against a high value target to be carried out. For example, consider a 
NETBIOS/SMB connection to an LDAP/Active Directory File System Share, using 
TCP/IP over 802.11 WLAN frames.  
Indeed, our threat model assumes that the Adversary utilizes some form of 
passive traffic analysis in order to discover the vulnerable Wireless Access Point of the 
FUP. However, it is also mentioned in our threat model description that passive pre-
attack methods only yield reconnaissance intelligence, and do not provide the Adversary 
the desired access to the sensitive systems and data. 
 Our system is not designed to detect or counter Passive Only Traffic Analysis 
Attacks. 
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 Our system assumes that an Attacker must utilize Active Transmission to 
perform any attacks against High Value FUP Sensitive System and Data 
Targets. 
Sensor Command and Control System 
Each detection sensor in our system communicates via a distribution system 
providing backplane connectivity to a centralized Command and Control (C2) segment. 
In our design, wireless communications from sensor to C2 system must be avoided, in 
order to remain out-of-band from the wireless communications network being monitored 
for protection; if the sensors utilized wireless communications they would interfere 
directly in the RF environment being monitored for threats and unnecessarily complicate 
our detection scheme. Therefore, it is a design requirement that communications with the 
C2 system be performed over a wired connection that is electronically separated from 
wireless activity of interest. As shown in Figure 3.4, there are multiple WIDAR devices 
deployed at strategic points along the perimeter of our model FUP, such that when more 
than one detection sensor triggers and collects LOB data for a would-be attacker these 
data can be integrated by C2 software to estimate a spatial location for an emitter, within 
some acceptable statistical error margin.  
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Figure 3.6. Command and Control System. Sensors are connected via a hardwired distribution system, such 
as Ethernet, to a centralized system featuring support for the higher-level Monitoring and Reporting System 
through an Application Programming Interface. A threat analyst is shown interacting with the Monitoring 
System directly, and with the C2 System via API calls built into the Monitor System. In this way, the threat 
analysts can receive Detection Alerts, as well as Configure Red Zone boundaries and other high-level 
system control parameters. 
LOB estimates are integrated by C2 for input into a Target Location Processor 
(TLP) which outputs estimates of spatial attribution parameters. In our present system, 
the TLP utilizes a simple trigonometric position estimator, which triangulates a target 
location based on target LOB data, and a priori knowledge of system sensor deployment 
locations. Figure 3.7 depicts the simple triangulation scheme we are utilizing in the 
preliminary phases of our system testing. Poisel’s Target Location Methods in 
Communications Electronic Warfare [13] details location estimators based around 
gradient descent least squares error minimization algorithms, which we plan to explore in 
a future paper centered on testing and improving the accuracy and performance of our 
WIDAR Sensor. 
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Figure 3.7. Simple Triangulation Model for Initial System Testing. This scheme operates on the assumption 
that the Command and Control system has a priori knowledge of the distance between sensors. Since 
sensors are statically deployed about the exterior of the Facility Under Protection, these metrics are easily 
obtained. 
Monitoring and Reporting System 
Potential detections are displayed to security analysts via visualization and 
reporting tools interfaced to the WIDAR C2 module via an extensible application 
programming interface (API). We show screen captures of two such Monitoring and 
Reporting System tools which were developed as prototypes during our research in 
Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9.  
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Figure 3.8. Monitoring and Reporting System – Prototype 1. In this configuration, RSSI data from the 
device antennas are displayed in separate visualization panels. The upper portion of each panel area 
displays spectrum usage as a function of channel power density, while the lower section displays the same 
density data, but with the change in density over time added on the abscissa axis. In the center of the 
display is the monopulse ratio of the antenna array. 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Monitoring and Reporting System – Prototype 2. In this configuration, RSSI data from both 
antennas of the device array are integrated into a common data model. The results are displayed as a polar 
plot of RSSI level for each bearing scanned. The screen capture above shows the current bearing of the 
device array using a red pattern – the device is currently scanning with a bearing of approximately 135° – 
with the plot lines in yellow also indicating strong RF activity detected when the device scanned near the 
270° bearing. 
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WIDAR Detection Sensor System Architecture 
At this point, we have presented the threat landscape for a hypothetical facility 
along with the capabilities and motivation of an adversary who is determined to launch an 
attack on a wireless network she had detected in operation at this facility. Our adversary 
has made a thorough assessment, and after much planning, she has concluded that for an 
attack to present the least amount of detection risk the attack should originate from a 
location on the facility grounds, but not actually inside the physical confines of the 
facility as it is too tightly secured for direct penetration. Tactically speaking, the 
Adversary has selected from her arsenal the Parking Lot Attack as the best weapon for 
accomplishing her mission objective: penetrating the sensitive systems and data of the 
facility. 
We have also described our own secret weapon, which is a network of sensors 
deployed on and about the facility we are protecting, with the aim of detecting just such a 
class of attack. Due to clever camouflage techniques, the Adversary remains unaware that 
such a system is defending the FUP. We have also illustrated how the sensors are 
integrated, and communicate with a centralized Command and Control system. Each 
sensor has the capability to calculate a Line-of-Bearing for any RF Target detected within 
the sensor operational range. LOB’s from multiple sensors can be combined to form a 
position fix by the Command and Control system. This system is capable of providing 
enhanced situational awareness to the security team tasked with protecting the sensitive 
systems and data of the facility, in terms of emitter detection and spatial attribution. A 
Threat Analyst can use situational decision support data to make an assessment if an 
attack is underway. The Threat Analyst may then choose whether to direct 
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countermeasures such as a security incident response team to further investigate and 
potentially interdict any attack. 
Architectural Overview 
We next focus on a detailed description of the design and capabilities of the 
sensor device forming the core of our WIDAR system, with the aim of explaining how a 
sensor implements Line-of-Bearing detection functionality. These devices constitute the 
backbone in our system for countering the Parking Lot Attack. Figure 3.10 shows an 
illustration of a sensor implementation we constructed to perform experiments during this 
research.  
 
Figure 3.10. A second-generation implementation of our detection sensor. Visible are the two high-gain 
antennas of the array, and the rotation chassis. The rotation chassis is mounted to a fixed base, supported by 
four adjustable ground leveling pads. 
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Figure 3.11 presents the system block diagram for a typical WIDAR sensor. The 
two primary sub-systems responsible for the critical RF detection and sensor orientation 
detection attributes are highlighted on the right side of the block diagram. These two sub-
systems communicate with a master microcontroller unit (MCU) via the slip-ring 
connector. The Master Control MCU, in turn, is interfaced to an Ethernet controller 
providing wired backbone communications between the sensor and the C2 system.  There 
are two primary sub-systems responsible for RF Target Detection and Spatial Attribution: 
 RF Sense Blocks – The sub-system tasked with sampling the device antenna 
array for RF Signals data. 
 Array Orientation Blocks – The sub-system tasked with mechanically steering 
the antenna array during search. This includes functionality for sensing the 
angular bearing of the antenna array. 
Both of these sub-systems appear as highlighted sections of Figure 3.11. 
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Figure 3.11. A Block Diagram of the Detection Sensor. The two sub-systems considered critical for RF 
detection and antenna array orientation tracking are background highlighted on the right side of the 
diagram. 
Functionality for RF Target Detection and Position Estimation 
Each detection sensor deployed as part of the WIDAR system contains a dual-
antenna array for RF sensing. Two antennas are operated, borrowing simultaneous lobing 
techniques from Monopulse Radar systems. These antennas are operated as an antenna 
array with a combined beam pattern capable of yielding angular sense outputs that are 
more accurate and less susceptible to RF noise due to jitter than a system only operated 
using a single antenna. Detailed treatments on the theory and operation of monopulse 
radar systems can be found here [14] [15] [16]. We review the technique, from the 
context of our implementation in the following two sections. 
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The RF Sense-Array Sub-System and the Monopulse Concept 
In a monopulse antenna array, power readings from multiple antennas are read by 
a comparator with ports fed by both antennas, to form a single ratio of the antenna gain 
present in each of the array elements. Phase ratios can be used as well, but more stringent 
array geometry is required to maintain phase coherence along the array boresight. The 
ratio, either from gain or phase, is called the Monopulse Ratio by many texts on the 
subject. While our system design and implementation is capable of measuring both the 
Gain and Phase monopulse ratios, it has not yet made use of phase, due to this more 
complex design requirement. A device measuring this ratio, called a monopulse 
processor, forms an output measurement that is purely a function of Angle-of-Arrival for 
an emitter detected in the two beams of the array antenna patterns.  
Furthermore, the use of a monopulse array offers an advantage over less 
sophisticated emitter detection strategies. A naïve strategy sometimes encountered in 
systems attempting RF target tracking is where a single antenna is mechanically steered 
and the Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) is monitored during this sweep. A 
database of RSSI measurements is built during the sweep, which can be analyzed to 
estimate a peak RSSI following a complete sweep rotation, and when paired with a 
bearing measurement output from the mechanical steering sub-system, an LOB can be 
calculated. The monopulse literature calls this technique sequential lobing [15] [16].  
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Figure 3.12. Sequential Lobing using a Single Directional Antenna.  
The trouble with this method is that variations due to nonlinearities inherent to the 
way an RF signal propagates introduce too much unwanted noise in the RSSI 
measurements from sample to sample. Radar engineers use terms like scatter, 
scintillation, and glint to classify the sources of these nonlinearities [13] [16] and group 
them all into an effect called pulse-to-pulse jitter. Multipath reinforcement or cancellation 
of a signal also has a significant impact on the accuracy of a system using sequential 
lobing techniques. The end result of all of these variations is that an RSSI measurement 
could vary in a significant way from sample to sample obtained during a collection 
sequence. The effect of this noise in collection is that any database recording the peak 
measurement data becomes skewed by the uncertainty in whether a peak is the result of a 
real emitter RSSI measurement being detected or erroneous estimation. 
In contrast, employing monopulse methods when lobing an emitter results in the 
effects of pulse-to-pulse jitter becoming common mode to both array antennas. By 
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forming the ratio of signal power entering each antenna, nonlinearities are assumed to 
affect the signal entering the beam pattern of each antenna in the same way, 
simultaneously. Thus, the ratio formed becomes purely a function of angle-of-arrival of 
the detected RF energy in the beam [15]. More importantly, each measurement of the 
gain or phase ratio, from the antenna array stands alone, yielding a line-of-bearing for an 
emitter detected in the array beam pattern. Indeed, the term monopulse derives from this 
fact, that a single (e.g. “mono”) measurement of a radar pulse is sufficient to estimate an 
LOB for a detected target.  
 
Figure 3.13. Simultaneous Lobing using the Monopulse Technique. A ratio is formed using gain data 
measured at Antenna A and Antenna B. Since both antennas are experiencing the same RF non-linearities 
due to measurement error, jitter, and multipath reflections, these errors become common mode, leaving the 
ratio formed purely the result of angle of the active transmitter from the array boresight. Each ratio 
measurement contains angle information, resulting in line-of-bearing estimate from only a single pulse of 
RF measurement, hence the name Monopulse. 
A final note on monopulse: the ratio eliminates an ambiguity that arises during 
sequential lobing, namely that an increase or decrease in RSSI detected during sequential 
lobing does not yield any directionality parameter (left or right in azimuthal traverse) 
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since the RSSI parameter at that measurement point is a 1-dimensional data term. By 
contrast, since the monopulse lobing measurement is formed from a ratio of the gain 
difference between two separate antenna beam patterns, the ratio provides a directional 
component with each measurement. For example, if Antenna A has higher gain, and 
Antenna B has lower gain, the target must be more directly in the pattern of Antenna A, 
so the target should lie to the left of the antenna array boresight, and the monopulse ratio 
would be a negative result – assuming the ratio is normalized to zero when a target is 
directly on boresight of the monopulse array. In mathematical terms, the monopulse 
lobing ratio parameter is represented as an odd function of transmitter angle-of-arrival at 
the antenna array. 
The Monopulse Processor 
There are various accepted methods of monopulse processor implementation in 
the present state of practice. Most use differing forms of microwave signal combiners 
such as hybrid rings or junctions to produce simultaneous sum and difference outputs for 
a given antenna feed network.  Most tracking radars implement the combiner network 
using waveguide technology [16], but there are research papers that describe transmission 
networks implemented in stripline and microstrip for low power microwave monopulse 
systems [17] [18]. 
The front-end feed network containing sum and difference ports is typically 
down-sampled by mixing with an intermediate frequency VCO, followed by the voltage 
(not power) being digitized by a pair of base-band ADC units. The ADC pair is a 
peripheral of an MCU or FPGA, which can then provide the sum and difference channel 
outputs to a signal processing computer for range and angle-of-arrival analysis. 
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The WIDAR Monopulse Processor Implementation 
To minimize cost and implementation complexity, our system follows a slightly 
different approach to monopulse processor implementation than most conventional 
systems. Our feed network is composed of a bandpass filter fed PCB signal trace entering 
a discrete integrated circuit. The Analog Devices AD8302 Gain-Phase Comparator [19] 
features dual matched logarithmic amplifier networks. While not as commonplace as 
microwave combiner networks, Monopulse Principles and Techniques does present at 
least one design utilizing a logarithmic amplifier comparator as a method for 
implementing a monopulse processor [16].  
 
Figure 3.14. WIDAR Device Monopulse Processor Board. At the top is the AD8302 Gain/Phase 
Comparator. Dual 2.4 GHz radios are available for spectrum sampling and received signal strength 
applications. An Atmel ATmega 168 MCU is located near the bottom of the PCB. This MCU can configure 
the onboard radios, but is primarily tasked with sampling the AD8302 Gain Comparator using its built-in 
hardware ADC. Two BNC to RP-SMA connectors are connected to the PCB, allowing the board to be 
interfaced with the chassis 2.4 GHz antenna array. 
46 
 
Preliminary Monopulse Processor Data 
Figure 3.15 depicts a command and control software tool we created to visualize 
the monopulse ratio data output of the detection sensor. The vertical white line in the 
center of the plot shows where the monopulse ratio is balanced between both the left and 
right array antennas. The figure shows four complete rotations of the antenna array 
chassis. Near the bottom of the plot, there was not an active RF emitter operating in the 
area, so the ratio remains closely aligned with the vertical central axis. 
An active RF Target was positioned so that it would be lobed by the monopulse 
array. This can be seen in the top half of the signal plot, where monopulse ratio data are 
shown for two complete rotations of the sensor while the emitter target was active. When 
the emitter is in the array beamwidth, the monopulse ratio signal first peaks towards one 
antenna of the array, followed by peaking on the other array antenna.  
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Figure 3.15. A Gain Plot collected from two rotations of Device Antenna Array. Two full rotations of the 
device antenna array are shown. Two sinusoidal waveforms shown near the top half of the display indicate 
that an active emitter is detected in the array beam pattern. The RF Target is on boresight when the 
waveforms cross the center axis – which is the point when the antenna gains from each array element are 
detected as being equal. A 256 point moving average filter is implemented to assist waveform smoothing. 
 The Antenna Array Azimuth Orientation Control Sub-System 
The Antenna Array Azimuth Orientation Control Sub-System is responsible for 
mechanically steering the antenna array to permit RF Sensing along a desired scan 
bearing. The sub-system accomplishes this task through two key functional blocks:  
 Mechanical Rotation using DC Gearhead Motor Drive under software control. 
 Position Sense using highly sensitive Magnetic Encoders. 
In-Beam RF Emission 
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Mechanical Rotation System for Array Azimuth Positioning 
Physical positioning of the antenna array is controlled by the Motor Control Sub-
System shown in Figure 3.11. This sub-system is implemented by a PCB featuring the 
STM Microelectronics L298 H-Bridge driver. This driver has the capability to drive up to 
two DC gearhead motors at up to 2amps continuous output, with 3A peak output 
capabilities. Our chassis integrates a single DC gearhead motor to drive the rotation of 
the antenna array. This motor typically draws only 60 mA of current during position 
change operations. The driver is also capable of directional control – forward and reverse 
– of the motor, along with an enable input pin, that can be switched on and off using 
PWM for precise speed control.  
 
Figure 3.16. A close up shot of the motor and mechanical assembly on the sensor. The DC gearhead motor 
is housed in the PVC enclosure seen in the top left. A drive sprocket attached to the motor rotates a chain 
attached to the larger sprocket affixed to the chassis base. Also visible is a tension system added to 
maintain proper chain tension without over-stressing the drive train. 
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The PCB completes the mechanical positioning sub-system by integrating a 
control microprocessor – the Atmel ATmega 168 MCU - for sourcing PWM speed 
control signals, and responsible for direction and speed selection of the antenna array. 
This MCU receives control instructions from the Master Control MCU. The Master 
Control MCU can control the array position directly, or relay higher level array 
positioning commands from the C2 sub-system coming off the wired distribution system 
of the device.  
Magnetic Rotational Encoder for Array Azimuth Position Sensing 
The WIDAR device utilizes a chassis mounted magnetic rotational encoder to 
sense azimuthal rotation bearing. Our system implementation uses the Austrian 
Microsystems AS5306 mag encoder with quadrature A,B, and INDEX pulses typically 
found on most incremental encoder hardware [20]. Our design operates the AS5306 
encoder in conjunction with the MR-12-72 ring magnet, featuring 72 magnets arrayed in 
a back-to-back pole configuration. The AS5306 IC is capable of sensing the magnetic 
pole change at each magnet junction, as well as providing interpolated encoder pulses 
based on reading the magnetic field change between junctions. This combination of pole 
change indexing and sensed interpolation yields 5760 encoder ticks per revolution or a 
positional accuracy of .0625 degrees. A photograph of the encoder mounted to the chassis 
of our sensor implementation is shown in Figure 3.17. 
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Figure 3.17. A close up shot of the encoder mounted just above a magnetic ring installed atop the main 
drive sprocket. The encoder package is mounted in a small custom PCB and the PCB is mounted on a 
spring loaded floating support cantilevered from a mount point located beneath the main chassis housing. 
The spring loaded support maintains the encoder sensor in proper position floating .5mm above the 
magnetic ring, and also allows for any rotational misalignment to be tolerated between the upper and lower 
chassis housings. 
As shown in Figure 3.11, the encoder is interfaced to the Motor Control MCU of 
our WIDAR system, and each tick is processed by an interrupt service routine (ISR) run 
on the MCU. The ISR, when triggered, can read the quadrature values on the A and B 
encoder pins to determine the chassis azimuth rotation direction, and in turn, increment or 
decrement the internal position state counter block.  
The INDEX pulse output by the encoder is also utilized to detect missed encoder 
pulses (missed due to slow interrupt handling or mag-sensor noise). Misses, if undetected 
introduce drift into the encoder state counter block. The INDEX pulse is triggered every 
160 channel pulses, and when the INDEX pin is high on the MCU, the channel pulse 
delta from a previous INDEX pin reading can be calculated to ensure that the channel 
pulse total is 160. If the sum is not the expected value, a drift correction offset can be 
determined using the channel pulse total subtracted from the expected value.  
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To complement the INDEX pulse, the AS5306 encoder hardware outputs an 
analog magnetic field strength indication (MFI) on a pin that is interfaced to one of the 
Motor Control MCU 10-bit analog digital converters. Currently, no closed-loop control 
processing includes this reading, but C2 user interface software does display the voltage 
reading to an analyst, which proved useful to detect a problem encountered during bench 
testing when metal filings debris became attached to the ring magnet. The voltage 
dropped below the threshold recommended by the datasheet and INDEX pulses showed 
missing position channel pulses whenever the encoder head passed over a specific region 
of the magnet. This region contained metal filings, which when removed, solved the 
missing INDEX pulse problem. 
Our system also includes provisions for the Motor Control MCU to send an error 
packet indicating the drift detection for processing by higher level C2 software. After 
some initial tuning and some debris removal from the ring magnet, our implementation 
encoder has not exhibited any operational drift, and tests using the encoder values to park 
the antenna array at a home position have shown the encoder to be highly accurate. 
Figure 3.18 shows a logic analyzer screen capture of the encoder INDEX and A/B 
channels. 
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Figure 3.18. Encoder pins captured on logic analyzer. In this capture the A and B channels can be seen to 
be 90° out of phase with each other. This quadrature shift is used to determine the direction of rotation 
when the array is mechanically steered. The INDEX pulse can also be seen triggering after each succession 
of 40 A/B pulses. Counting encoder ticks and analyzing whether 40 ticks were received after each INDEX 
tick can be used to error check the encoder for missed detections, which would introduce drift errors.  
In our present implementation, the main routine running on the Motor Control 
MCU reads the current position state counter block for packaging inside an encoder 
position packet for transmit to the Main Control MCU. Each encoder position packet 
contains the current azimuth position, and the current rotation direction. This packet 
sending operation is performed continuously on the Motor Control MCU, with a new 
packet being readied whenever the previous encoder position packet is finished 
transmitting.  
Visualizing Array Position – A Screen from the Monitoring and Reporting System 
Figure 3.19 shows the C2 software user interface which displays array traverse 
position to an analyst. In the prototype version shown, the user interface also has a slider 
providing the analyst manual forward and reverse control of the antenna array traverse 
position. An emergency stop button is also provided to halt all motor positioning activity 
if necessary. 
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Figure 3.19. The Monitoring and Reporting System view of antenna array azimuthal bearing. In this screen 
capture the array has an orientation of 65.06° – indicated by the green shaded graphical sweep displayed on 
top the polar grid, and the bearing readout at the lower left. Also visible are a slider control enabling the 
Threat Analyst to manually steer the sensor antenna array – this feature is useful for sensor calibration and 
for fine grained control of the array when manually combing a Red Zone area. A reading showing the 
strength of the magnetic field in proximity to the encoder ring magnet is also displayed in the lower right of 
this GUI. 
Recommendations for Improved Array Position Control on Future Implementations 
Our present implementation operates using a simple open-loop position control 
routine. This routine is a simple counter which ramps the h-bridge controlling motor 
speed from zero to the peak speed value, and then back down again to zero. While this 
routine is effective in scanning the device position array, and we were able to tune it to 
achieve a desired step arc length, better scan capability could be achieved with a two 
stage closed loop PID controller. We recommend that any future implementation 
integrate PID control of velocity with a second PID stage controlling position.  
This capability would enable precision scan tracking – for example the array 
could be instructed to scan a specific pattern. Also homing – the ability of the controller 
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to accurately position the array along a specific boresight vector – would be a useful 
capability enabled by these enhancements. One possible scenario using this behavior is 
the designation of scan zones for the device array, where the device sweeps a pre-selected 
sector instead of performing a complete rotation. Another scenario would be the precision 
tracking of a detected target that is moving. 
Minor Sub-Systems 
We briefly cover, for completeness, several of the minor sub-systems which 
provide operational support for the sensor.  
The Slip Ring – Enabling Continuous Rotation Capability 
As previously mentioned, the WIDAR sensor is capable of 360º continuous 
rotation scanning. This is mechanically accomplished through the use of the 12 channel 
Keyo KYC-12A slip ring connector, shown in Figure 3.20. The use of a slip ring 
facilitates a simpler control scheme, avoiding the use of mechanical limit switches that 
would be needed if our system only supported a partial rotation range. We incorporated 
continuous rotation into our sensor implementation following lessons learned from our 
first generation chassis. The prior implementation of the chassis lacked slip ring support 
and suffered from a limited range of scan, required mechanical and electronic limiting in 
the design to prevent chassis damage in the event of over-steer, and the wiring harness 
cabling the antenna array in this implementation was much more complex due to the 
increased range of travel and mechanical stress. 
Design Flaws Inhibiting Slip Ring Communications Signals 
In our present device implementation, the two sub-systems shown shaded in 
Figure 3.11 both communicate with the Master Control MCU and Power Service Units 
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via the 12 slip ring channels. This includes both control and 12V power signals for the 
chassis steering motor. The control signals are high speed SPI signals which are very 
susceptible to clock interference and cross talk. Exasperating this problem is the fact that 
the slip ring channels are not shielded from one another.  
This choice of design has introduced many challenges in our operational testing. 
The SPI bus communications fails whenever the chassis position motor is engaged, even 
at the lowest data rate, and with the addition of filtering circuitry on all clock and bus 
lines. Failure occurs in the form of SPI calls which poll the RF Target Detection Sub-
System. Calls to read registers on RF sub-system hardware become corrupted in transit. 
Since this hardware uses a communications protocol that does not implement foreword 
error correction or command packet checksum, corrupted commands are interpreted by 
the hardware as other configuration instructions, which lead to an invalid state of 
operation. This failure robs our implementation of a true track-while-scan capability, a 
key requirement if our tracking system is to have the capability to rapidly detect and 
spatially attribute attacking RF Targets.  
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Figure 3.20. The Keyo KYC-12A slip ring connector supporting continuous 360° rotation of 12 control 
channels. This is an inexpensive connector sourced directly from a Chinese distributor. The ability to 
continuously rotate the sensor antenna array supports a simpler control scheme; one that does not require 
limit switches or a wiring harness with cabling supporting a large amount of lateral travel. However, noise 
is an issue when using this connector for high speed digital signals. Also, we attempted to send analog 
power signals side-by-side with these digital signals – with some isolation practices employed. This proved 
unworkable during use cases attempting continuous track-while-scan operations. To counter noise issues on 
this prototype, the mechanical steering sub-system is never operated in unison with the RF sense sub-
system. This permitted research tests, but would not be practical in a real deployment situation. 
For research data collection purposes, we settled on a fix, with the solution being 
to disable RF sense operations while the motor is positioning the antenna array. A 
solution we call the “Pan-then-Scan” mode of operation. This permits all device 
functionality to be tested in an operational environment, but at the expense of much 
reduced scanning speed. This solution is only a remedy for data collection purposes, 
enabling us to collect real field data in an operational setting.  
As such, we did not find this speed reduction to be a barrier to our research testing 
since our RF Targets were static and in known positions. However an attacker with 
57 
 
knowledge of this reduction in scan speed could easily exploit such an implementation 
flaw, in effect creating blind spots in our Red Zone coverage. Any next-generation 
implementation will need to resolve this issue, allowing true Track-While-Scan 
capability. We recommend the following changes to better facilitate a Track-While-Scan 
capability on any future implementation: 
 Eliminate any Analog Power Signals on the upper (rotating) part of the device 
chassis.  
 It follows then that the entire Antenna Array Orientation Sub-System should 
then be relocated to the lower (fixed) section of the device frame.  
 Do not attempt high-speed SPI communications over an unshielded slip ring 
network. Choose a scheme employing differential signals – such as RS-485 – 
which will yield better communications reliability and permit a higher 
sampling rate given adequate transceiver selection. 
 Introduce hardware capable of verifying the integrity of the digital 
communications signals passing over the slip ring. Employ a simplex scheme 
capable of CRC or FEC. 
Communications Interface to Wired Distribution System 
A dedicated Serial-to-Ethernet Controller serves as the communications interface 
between the Command and Control system and the Master Control MCU. Figure 3.21 
shows the Lantronix XPORT controller [21], which features buffered IO, and easy 
TCP/IP configuration via an onboard web server. 
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Figure 3.21. The XPORT 100mbps Serial-to-Ethernet Bridge. Limitations in the internal resonator clocking 
the master MCU keep serial communications speeds between MCU and bridge to a modest 38,400 BAUD. 
GPS Sub-System 
GPS hardware interfaced to the master MCU provides geo-location functionality 
enabling each sensor to accurately determine spatial location. The coordinates of the 
sensor location when combined with the coordinates of any other sensor enable the 
calculation of the Known Baseline Distance parameter, feeding the triangulation 
estimates outlined in the calculations presented in Figure 3.7. 
Power Service Unit 
All power for the device is provided via the Power Service Unit (PSU) shown in 
Figure 3.11. The PSU consists of a single PCB integrating discrete packaged switch 
mode power supplies sourcing 3.3V and 5.0 V for the digital electronics of the WIDAR 
device. The PSU also provides an analog pass through of the 12 input supply serving as 
the source input to the motor control sub-system. 
Other Specialized Functionality of Interest in this Research 
The device we constructed for our experiments is a second-generation platform 
developed with the intention of RF target spatial attribution in the 2.4 GHz band. In this 
section we touch on several implementation features which we have discovered to be 
useful in experiment design and platform configuration flexibility.  
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Generic Packet Communications Stack for All System Controllers 
All MCUs in our design are AVR controllers from Atmel – ATmega 168 
processors to be specific. The datasheet for this line of micros is available here [22]. 
Firmware for these systems is developed using the Atmel Studio 5 IDE with initial 
programming handled by the AVRISP-MKII in system programmer. The ISP is only 
used for an initial burn of a custom and very lightweight bootloader onto each MCU. All 
subsequent programming is performed over the Ethernet-to-Serial-to-SPI packet 
communications sub-system. 
Making Firmware Changes – Using a Bootloader for In-System-Programming over 
Ethernet 
As previously noted in our architecture description, there are three separate Atmel 
AVR ATmega 168 microcontrollers operating within each WIDAR sensor environment. 
Our initial implementation utilized an Atmel MK II AVR programmer to program each 
MCU. This required the programmer to be directly connected to the In System 
Programming (ISP) port on each system PCB board when firmware program changes 
were required (and there were many changes required and many still ongoing during 
experiments with our system). The device chassis design had access points intended to 
support direct connection of the ISP programmer, with clock connection routed to the 
target MCU by means of a rotary encoder. During our bench tests, the high speed clock 
would not operate properly over the mechanical rotary encoder, which resulted in failed 
EEPROM updates. Furthermore, sometimes, an MCU on the shared programming bus 
(and not an intended firmware update target) would cease operating due to EEPROM 
corruption following the programming of another target MCU on the shared bus. We 
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believe this was due to undesired crosstalk of the clock signal into other MCU clock 
lines. 
The failure of the ISP ports accessible on the chassis exterior mandated that we 
then had to disassemble the device chassis in order to access the ISP port on each system 
PCB directly. This was an unacceptable and painstaking process which needed to be 
remedied with an engineering design change. The solution we arrived at was to pre-
program each MCU with a small footprint (e.g. less than 1024 kB) bootloader capable of 
loading firmware object code into MCU EEPROM via serial or SPI communications, 
rather than the dedicated device programmer hardware (the device programmer was still 
required to burn in the initial bootloader image).  
The use of bootloaders on each system MCU has enabled rapid reprogramming of 
any MCU firmware of the WIDAR device without the need for disassembly or 
connection of a dedicated firmware programmer. Figure 3.22 shows a screen shot of the 
device firmware update control software user interface. Firmware update control software 
addresses updates to each MCU bootloader as a node on the main system bus, with each 
MCU made reachable over either of the Ethernet to Serial, or Serial to SPI 
communications bridges. 
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Figure 3.22. Device Firmware Update Tool. A binary file is produced by the MCU Development IDE, and 
once compiled, can be uploaded to any of the four MCUs on the device over an Ethernet connection 
between MCU and the device C2 system. 
Spectrum Analysis using System on Chip Radios 
Our device is also equipped with a pair of 2.4 GHz system on chip radios 
featuring programmable channel bandwidths. A PCB in the RF Sense sub-system hosts 
the two radios, monolithic CC2500 radio-on-chip packages from Texas Instruments [23]. 
These packages are surface mount, and require very little external hardware, except for 
an antenna matching network. Each of these radios is interfaced to the common SPI bus 
connecting all device peripherals to the Master Control MCU.  
While the CC2500 is a full transceiver featuring several configurable 
modulation/demodulation schemes, we utilize only the RX mode of operation and the 
Receive Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) estimation functionality onboard the radio, 
which serves our device as a low-cost spectrum analyzer. The two radios embedded in 
our system each support spectrum sampling from one antenna in the device array.  
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This spectrum sampling capability is useful in making determinations of the 
modulation scheme in use by a detected RF target – for example it is easy to distinguish a 
target using Bluetooth versus a target employing 802.11 protocols. Furthermore, when 
detecting WiFi traffic, we can easily make the determination if the target is in a channel 
band that is the same as that in use by the FUP and is a direct threat to Wireless Access 
Point attacks. 
Visualization of Channel RSSI Outputs 
The primary purpose of integrating system on chip radios into our system is to 
provide spectrum visualization services to further enhance the RF situation awareness 
capability offered by the device to Threat Analysts. Figure 3.23 shows a screen capture of 
our Monitoring and Reporting tool actively sensing 2.4 GHz activity and providing visual 
spectrum utilization data. Activity in 802.11 channel 11 is clearly visible in the spectrum 
diagram. Additional RF activity is also shown as a series of peaked narrowband 
channelized waveforms in the display. 
 
Figure 3.23. Spectrum Heat Plot from 2.4 GHz Radio Sub-System of WIDAR Device. The device was not 
actively rotating when data were collected for this Heat Plot. 
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To complement the visualization functionality shown in Figure 3.23, our system 
features one additional tool designed for visualizing spectrum samples over time. Called 
a “waterfall” or “topographic” plot by similar software tools [24], this tool depicts a top-
down look at the spectrum peak values, with time plotted on the ordinal axis. A plot of 
the spectrum visualized in this manner is shown in Figure 3.24. This plot is visualizing 
the same spectrum samples as those collected and displayed in Figure 3.23. In this 
diagram, past heavy usage of the 802.11 channel 11 can clearly be seen on the right side.  
Intermittent activity in the other parts of the spectrum can be seen as small dashed 
patterns in the plot. 
 
Figure 3.24. Spectrum Topographical Plot from 2.4 GHz Radio Sub-System of WIDAR device. 
Spectrum Sample Metadata – Enhancing Visualization Using Duty Cycle Metrics 
The channel duty cycle is defined as the number of times the sampled channel is 
above some predefined RSSI threshold, divided by the total number of channel samples 
(equ. 1). In an RF spectrum sampling context, channel duty can be also referred to as 
Channel Utilization. Typical duty thresholds are set 10 dB to 20 dB above the spectrum 
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noise floor [25]. In our system, the Channel Sample Configuration GUI provides a front-
end permitting the selection of the Duty Threshold. Careful selection of this parameter 
can eliminate spurious detected RSSI values, while emphasizing higher power and more 
frequent utilization of a sampled RF channel.  
For visualization applications, weighing the duty cycle typically involves 
displaying the channel power levels with higher measured Channel Duty (and hence, 
heavier channel utilization) as more pronounced or bolder color schemes.  
 
 
Channel Duty = 
Channel Samples Exceeding RSSI Threshold
Total Channel Samples
 (1)  
 
It is also common to aggregate channel samples by either frequency or duty cycle 
into a history data structure typically called a heat map, which organizes the spectrum 
into channels and further sub-divides each channel into discrete cells, one for each value 
of power level quantization. Each of these cells maintains a count of the number of 
samples that are identified as belonging to that power level. Again, each cell can assign a 
weight based on Duty Cycle to these sample counts in order to draw further emphasis 
towards cells with higher channel utilization. In Figure 3.24 a WLAN operating in 802.11 
Channel 11 (spanning 2451MHz to 2473MHz) can be seen to have a higher Channel 
Duty than other spectrum activity, thus giving the obtained spectrum power density 
samples more weight in those channels, making the WLAN density plot appear bolder 
and more pronounced in the visualization tool. 
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Concluding Remarks 
We have presented a system designed to detect and counter the Parking Lot 
Attack. Our system utilizes a distributed network of sensors to secure a region 
surrounding a facility where RF activity is monitored with a spatial attribution capability. 
Our system design detects and locates any active attempts to connect with wireless 
infrastructure in use inside the facility. Countermeasures can be directed towards 
locations of interest by threat analyst receiving notifications from our system. 
A key feature of our system is the use of monopulse radar methods to aide in RF 
transmitter geo-location. To test the capabilities of this feature, we constructed a real 
implementation of the sensor in our design. We provided an in-depth treatment of the 
sensor placement strategy for facility protection, along with hardware details of our 
implementation. We also provided recommendation for improvements in our system and 
device design, stemming directly from lessons learned during operational tests of our 
sensor. 
To compliment this work, which is focused on an architectural description of our 
system, we intend to release a follow on performance-focused work, concentrating on 
analyzing the detection and spatial attribution accuracy of our device implementation. 
Preliminary bench tests show promise when line of sight measurements are taken from an 
RF Target actively transmitting and detected in the lobes of the device antenna array. 
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Abstract 
In prior work we presented the design and architecture for a device utilizing 
monopulse radar methods to detect and spatially attribute an RF target transmitting in the 
2.4 GHz ISM band. The aim of our system was to detect and defend an environment 
against an adversary employing the Parking Lot Attack as a penetration and exfiltration 
vector. A tertiary implementation objective was to use low cost and off-the-shelf 
components in the construction of our device, while obtaining an acceptable performance 
with regard to spatial attribution accuracy. The ability of our device to accurately 
spatially attribute a wireless target is directly dependent on the capability of our device to 
both detect an active RF emitter and to subsequently assign a Line-of-Bearing (LOB) to 
any detected target. In this work we seek to use statistical methods to quantitatively 
assess the performance of our device for both detection and LOB estimation accuracy. A 
novel feature of our hardware is the application of monopulse radar principles and 
techniques to the 2.4 GHz ISM band. We begin by reviewing the concept of monopulse 
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in radar applications and how the concept is implemented on our prototype sensor. We 
next describe the testing methodology we used to systematically evaluate and quantify 
the performance of the instrument. Our experiments first focus on the establishment of 
baseline performance metric using data collected from a sequentially lobed single 
antenna detection sensor configuration. We then conduct experiments using a monopulse 
enabled sensor configuration, presenting two different DSP detectors for target detection 
and LOB estimation. Our experiments reveal statistically significant performance gains 
over the baseline sequential lobing scheme. We conclude with recommendations for 
device improvements and topics for future research.  
Introduction 
The topic of spatial attribution in wireless local area networks interests us, from a 
security standpoint, as a way of detecting unwanted or malicious use of a wireless 
network. We use the term spatial attribution to describe the process of assigning a geo-
location to a previously unidentified wireless emitter. The emitter, in our case, is typically 
the wireless local area network (WLAN) radio found on modern portable computers and 
handheld devices.  
Expanding on this idea, consider the increased situational awareness that location 
intelligence for devices connected to a wireless network could provide a wireless network 
administrator for a given environment. Given sufficient spatial accuracy, location-
enabled intelligence regarding authorized and unauthorized RF activity would enable 
administrators and security analysts to make decisions about the present wireless threat 
environment for a facility. For example, tools could be created that map out red-zones 
surrounding a facility perimeter, where any detected unauthorized wireless activity 
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triggers alerts that supplement the analytic and reporting capabilities of existing intrusion 
detection systems.  
State-of-the-Practice in Spatial Attribution for Wireless Devices 
Contemporary systems for identifying the location of wireless users are presented 
here [1], [2], [3]. These systems rely on a previously determined audit of signal 
propagation and signal strength estimates received from a distributed network of base 
stations within a wireless environment to perform host-based location estimation. A 
shortcoming of these systems is that constant change in the landscape of the wireless 
environment degrades positional accuracy, leading to the need for frequently recurring 
RF audits in order to maintain the accuracy of the location estimation system. 
Additionally, these systems are predominantly marketed towards personnel tracking and 
inventory management than for facility protection and security.  
Furthermore, most systems are commonly deployed within the interior of a 
facility, where instead our research seeks to focus on the environment immediately 
external to a facility, and the security threats existing there. We focus on the external 
environment, as it is common for the outdoor areas in the immediate vicinity of a facility 
to be used as the launch pad for externally staged wireless attacks [4], [5], [6]. This is the 
so-called “Parking Lot Attack”, which our research concerns itself with detecting.  
WIDAR: Our System for RF Target Spatial Attribution 
In prior work [7], [8] we presented WIDAR (Wireless Intrusion Detection and 
Ranging), our system employing monopulse radar methods, for detecting and tracking an 
emitting RF target operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band. One characteristic common to 
monopulse devices is that they utilize a multiple antenna array, in contrast to the single, 
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high gain antenna found on less sophisticated direction finding systems. The array 
antennas signals feed into specialized hardware that calculates the instantaneous ratio 
formed when measuring and comparing the individual array element signals. This 
hardware is called the monopulse processor, and the computed array ratio is called the 
monopulse ratio [9].  
The term monopulse stems from the theoretical observation that each monopulse 
ratio measurement contains information sufficient to estimate the instantaneous Line of 
Bearing (LOB) to any emitter actively transmitting within the geometry of the array beam 
pattern. This differs from LOB estimates made by a singular antenna, where in those 
schemes an entire rotation of the antenna platform is required to be performed before 
enough data are gathered to calculate a LOB estimate.  
There are many other benefits inherent to the monopulse method of LOB 
estimation, an important point being that any RF non-linearities, such as those stemming 
from multipath fading or destructive/constructive interference become common mode to 
all antenna elements in the array, nullifying the effects of jitter when the monopulse ratio 
is calculated to yield an angle estimate [9], [10]. Contrast this again to the less 
sophisticated, single antenna lobing scheme where readings are taken sequentially, and 
noise issues are integrated rather than cancelled. 
Conceptually, our system is composed of a directional antenna array composed of 
dual antennas mounted on a mechanically steerable chassis. Figure 4.1 displays an 
illustration of our prototype WIDAR system detection sensor. There are two primary sub-
systems: one tasked with RF sensing, and the other responsible for mechanically steering 
and sensing the azimuthal orientation of the antenna array.  
72 
 
 
The array antennas feed into low noise power amplifiers and band pass filters. 
Following the band pass filters, each signal path is split by a directional coupler. One 
component of each split signal is then input into a logarithmic gain detector [11].  
 
 
Figure 4.1. The WIDAR System Detection Sensor. Our device features a mechanically-steered, dual high-
gain antenna array, and the onboard RF processing electronics capable of providing LOB estimates using 
monopulse radar principles and methods. The RF functionality is complemented by the rotational encoder 
hardware necessary to precisely report the azimuthal orientation of the array chassis. As shown in the 
figure, the array boresight is found at the mid-line, halfway between the boresights formed by each antenna 
in the array. A slip ring permits the upper chassis mounting the array to rotate continuously, at the same 
time allowing control and data signal communications between the lower and upper chassis assemblies. 
The gain detector is an integrated circuit containing two RF input ports. These 
ports feed an integrated pair of tightly matched logarithmic detectors. Sampling the 
difference of these two detectors forms a gain/loss ratio, which is an acceptable source 
for monopulse ratio calculations [10]. The gain detector places the magnitude of the 
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detector gain ratio on an analog output pin of the detector IC which is, in turn, sampled 
by a 10 bit ADC [12] running on a microcontroller housed in the electronics bay of the 
detection sensor chassis. 
The remaining component of each split signal feeds a 2.4 GHz radio [13] tasked 
with measuring spectrum channel power. Channel power samples are averaged and can 
be viewed by analysts, as a supplement to the monopulse ratio, providing additional 
situational awareness capabilities. 
The steering sub-system is composed of an H-bridge controlling the direction and 
speed of a rotation drive motor, and a magnetic encoder [14] that can accurately sense the 
azimuthal rotation of the upper sensor chassis, which mounts the antenna array. The 
magnetic encoder on our prototype provides 5760 encoder pulses per revolution, 
providing 0.0625 degree azimuthal orientation accuracy. The encoder also features an 
index pulse every 160 encoder pulses, which we use to detect slips or skips in the 
microcontroller interrupt routines responsible for counting encoder ticks. This permits us 
to detect and correct for azimuthal sensor drift when and if it occurs. A conceptual block 
diagram detailing each of these sub-systems is shown in Figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4.2. Block Diagram of Critical Detection Sensor Sub-Systems. Figure 4.2.a shows functional blocks 
composing the RF Sensing sub-system, and Figure 4.2.b shows functional blocks composing the Rotation 
Scan sub-system. Both sub-systems send and receive commands and data to a higher level Command and 
Control system. 
Detection Performance Evaluation Experiments 
We wish to quantitatively analyze the performance of the system detection sensor 
we just described. Theoretical models estimate the line-of-bearing accuracy for our 
device at 1/10 array element beamwidth or less [10]. Given that our device antenna array 
has a single-element beamwidth of 25°, we expect to see performance metrics supporting 
gross angular resolutions of 2.5°, or ±1.25° from true heading.  
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Using a Multi-Phase Detection Evaluation Approach 
The experiments designed to evaluate detection sensor performance are divided 
into two distinctive research phases. In the first phase, we perform a battery of tests to 
define and quantify baseline performance metrics. These baseline metrics are intended to 
serve as a comparison gauge for the second phase of our experiments. The system 
performance baseline of Phase I is generated from data collected using an alternate 
configuration of our detection sensor, which features a singular antenna target detection 
and lobing scheme; a scheme referred to as sequential lobing in monopulse radar 
literature [9], [15], [10]. 
Phase II performs a similar battery of detection experiments, however, in this 
phase the detection sensor configuration is reset to the monopulse-enabled design. We 
hypothesize that the monopulse configuration of our prototype implementation will 
significantly outperform the baseline metrics collected using the single antenna sequential 
lobing scheme. Our two-phase, baseline-then-measure approach is summarized in Table 
4.1. 
Table 4.1. Summary of Detection Evaluation Experiment Phases. In Phase I, a baseline is developed using 
a single antenna only capturing peak RSSI. In Phase II, we capture metrics using a monopulse array to 
compare against the Phase I baseline data. The sensor configurations used in both Phase I and Phase II 
utilize the same mechanically steered base chassis for tracking and reporting antenna bearing.  
Evaluation Phase Detector Configuration Mechanically Steered Detector 
I Sequential Lobing Antenna Yes Peak RSSI 
II Monopulse Antenna Array Yes  Monopulse Ratio  
 
The Field Test Range 
In both phases of our performance evaluation, we perform a battery of in-field 
detection experiments against a moveable RF target with a pre-known position and a 
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controlled RF transmission profile. To ensure repeatability and to permit the accurate 
positioning of the RF Detection Target used in our experiments, we designed and 
surveyed a Field Test Range with pre-measured distance offsets located at known 
locations from a base position. These distance offsets were measured along a known 
directional bearing. The detection Field Test Range is detailed in Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3. Layout Plan-View of the Field Testing Range. The Detection Sensor is shown positioned at the 
intersection of the Detection Range Baseline and the Target Position Line. Range Test Points (labeled A, B, 
and C) are shown positioned at known distances from the Detection Range Baseline.  
We selected a field location situated on flat terrain and free from natural 
obstructions, with the intent of minimizing multipath reflections. We also desired to be 
far from man-made structures to avoid being in close proximity to potential sources of 
active WLAN activity to minimize direct sources of interference in the 2.4 GHz ISM 
band. The objective was to reduce the likelihood that detector readings logged during our 
experiments were affected by externally created signals and were more likely to include 
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only those signals produced by the RF Detection Target. Figure 4.4 shows an aerial map 
view depicting the Field Test Range location. 
 
Figure 4.4. Aerial View of the Field Test Range. We selected a site with the intent of being far from man-
made and natural structures.  
We used a 200 foot field tape measure to survey the detection range baseline and 
then measured a series of three Range Points along a Target Position Line oriented 90° 
orthogonal to the Detection Range Baseline. In all of our experiments, we carefully 
positioned an actively transmitting RF Detection Target on one of the Detection Range 
Points and collected detection data by mechanically sweeping the antenna chassis of the 
detection sensor through a minimum 180 degree sweep arc. During the two evaluation 
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phases, sweep runs at each Range Point were repeated after we made changes to the 
detection sensor configuration used during each phase. Figure 4.5 shows photographs 
from the actual field testing range we surveyed and utilized during our testing phases. 
The photographs are from Phase I tests; a collection scheme where only a single antenna 
detection sensor configuration was used. 
 
Figure 4.5. Photos of Detection Range During a Field Test. Figure 4.5.a shows a view of the Detection 
Sensor Base Position. A close-up detail of the platform and the Detection Sensor is shown in Figure 4.5.b. 
Also visible is the detection range measuring tape which was staked to the ground at the base of the 
Detection Sensor platform. Figure 4.5.c shows a view of the detection sensor scanning down range. The 
detection target can be seen at the far end of the range measuring tape.  
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Surveying the Ambient 2.4GHz Spectrum of the Field Test Range 
We used the spectrum channel sampling capability we designed for the WIDAR 
command and control system [7] to survey RF activity in the testing range wireless 
environment, both before and after we began operating any RF detection targets on the 
Field Test Range. Figure 4.6 shows the results of spectrum channel sampling before and 
after we deployed RF detection targets. Given the crowded and busy spectrum channel 
samples that we were used to seeing when developing and testing our system in a lab 
environment, we were pleased to find only faint 2.4 GHz signals operating in the 
spectrum when we collected data on the field test range. 
 
Figure 4.6. Comparing Environmental Channel Spectrum Power Samples. Shown are samples taken before 
the detection target was activated (Figure 4.6.a) and after (Figure 4.6.b) the RF detection target was made 
active. The RF detection target operated on 802.11g Channel 1, and can be seen clearly in the right image. 
The samples in the left image do show some weak activity, in what appears to be 802.11 Channel 11, 
although the activity is only just above the test range noise floor. 
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Phase I Experiments: Establishing Baseline Detection Sensor Metrics 
During Phase I, we utilized an older generation laptop running Xubuntu Linux 
14.02 LTS as the Detection Target on our RF Test Range. Figure 4.7 shows the Detection 
Target. The RF Detection Target ran LORCON [16], a C library supporting raw WLAN 
packet injection of 802.11 frames directly into the wireless environment of our RF test 
range. Since we could craft and inject raw 802.11 packets directly into the RF medium, 
no supporting infrastructure such as an Access Point or WLAN router were required to 
simulate active WLAN traffic. Using the LORCON library, we wrote a simple packet 
flooding tool to inject spoofed 802.11 Management Frame Beacon Packets [17]. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. The Phase I detection target was an older laptop that we fitted with an 802.11g card supporting 
Linux raw wireless packet injection. The 802.11g card contained WLAN hardware built around the Atheros 
chipset. 
Phase I Detection Sensor Configuration 
In Phase I of our evaluation experiments, we fielded an alternate detection sensor 
configuration employing a less sophisticated method of LOB estimation. In this scheme 
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only a single antenna is mechanically rotated, while a Received Signal Strength 
Indication (RSSI) is continuously recorded. A windowed moving average filter is then 
run against the recorded RSSI data to calculate a peak value that is recorded following 
each completed antenna chassis rotation. The LOB pointing to the emitter was assigned 
to this peak value calculated by the filter.  
The shortcomings of this method are well documented [9], [10] [16], but we 
chose to use metrics from this method as a gauge to determine whether our monopulse 
array detection prototype outperforms, underperforms, or compares similarly to an 
intentionally less sophisticated baseline method. Figure 4.8 shows the detection sensor in 
the single antenna lobing RSSI sensing configuration.  
 
 
 
82 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Chassis Configuration for Sequentially-Lobing Peak RSSI Detector. In this configuration, one 
monopulse array antenna is removed, and instead a small computer running Ubuntu Linux is mounted to 
the rotation chassis assembly. The single remaining antenna is boresighted in parallel to the chassis 
boresight, in contrast to the squinted boresight scheme used in the monopulse configuration of the detection 
sensor.  
Phase I Detection Sensor Data 
Data for Phase I were collected using two completely autonomous hardware 
systems, each with separate sense and data logging functionality. Azimuthal orientation 
data for the detection sensor chassis were logged using a laptop running the WIDAR 
Command and Control (C2) software [7]. The C2 software provided a user interface with 
the data logging functionality necessary to save rotation angle, encoder tick count, and 
timestamp to comma delimited ASCII files. These data were timestamped with a clock 
value set using NTP to ensure that the RSSI values, which were collected using different 
hardware, could be joined in a post-collection processing tool. 
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To log RSSI values, we used a small netbook physically mounted to the 
mechanically steered upper assembly of the detection sensor chassis. This computer ran 
the Ubuntu 11.02 LTS Linux operating system, which enabled a variety of security 
oriented tool chains to be deployed. We also configured the real time clock on this 
computer using the NTP protocol, and then we verified that this machine, along with the 
detection sensor C2 machine, were both running clocks that appeared tightly 
synchronized with each other.  
Additionally and perhaps more notably, this netbook featured an after-market 
modification that we made which permitted an external omnidirectional antenna to be 
connected directly to the WLAN card of the device. The computer and the external 
antenna modification are shown in Figure 4.9. The modification enabled us to directly 
connect a single high-gain antenna to the netbook; the exact same antenna used in the 
monopulse configuration of the detection sensor. 
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Figure 4.9. Photos of Linux Laptop Modified for Connection of External Antenna. The external RP-SMA 
connector is shown in Figure 4.9.a. Figure 4.9.b shows how an external antenna can then be mounted to the 
connector.  
The WLAN interface on the netbook was placed in monitor mode, which supports 
promiscuous packet sniffing, along with 802.11 channel hopping. We ran the Wireshark 
protocol analzyer [18] on the netbook to enable raw packet capture, and most 
importantly, the logging of all wireless activity seen by the netbook on the monitor mode 
enabled WLAN interface.  
This version of Linux also supported the mac80211 [19] driver which 
conveniently prepends additional WLAN metadata onto all received WLAN packets. 
These metadata were accessible in Wireshark under the radiotap headers [20], [21] 
protocol-decode section of the packet capture trace file. Figure 4.10 shows how 
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Wireshark presents these data. The radiotap metadata for Signal and Signal Noise were 
critical elements supporting our objectives for Phase I: the collection of baseline 
performance metrics. 
 
Figure 4.10. Wireshark View of Detection Sensor RSSI Packets. On Linux,Wireshark is able to use the 
libpcap driver to capture WLAN network traffic on any WLAN interface placed in Monitor mode. The 
Linux mac80211 driver system also prepends the radiotap header to wireless network packets. The radiotap 
extensions provide the signal strength and signal noise measurements necessary to create the RSSI logs for 
later analysis alongside the antenna bearing logs.  
We were also able to use Wireshark to filter detection sensor data by MAC 
address to select only those packets that matched the RF detection target MAC address. 
Protocol stack browsing functions of Wireshark were also used to view those protocol 
attributes that we required for our analysis. For the final step, Wireshark data export 
functionality was then used to save only the attributes were interested in, to a comma-
delimited text file. 
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Processing Phase I Data for Analysis 
We just described how data collected from the sensor produced two different 
output files, one from the detection sensor C2 machine, and one from the netbook 
attached to the antenna rotation chassis. These two data files both contain timestamp 
information that was previously synchronized using the NTP.  
We created a tool using Microsoft VB.NET 4.5 to join the two separate datasets 
using the common timestamp. The tool used a fuzzy matching algorithm to join the data, 
requiring only that any matched timestamps be within a preset threshold time, to be 
joined. If there was more than one candidate meeting the join threshold, additional 
proximity analysis was performed to determine the nearest timestamp match. All joins 
were one to one. Figure 4.11 contains a block diagram illustrating the data join process. 
Table 4.2 shows the data format of the resulting join process. A data file in this format is 
then fed to analysis logic tasked with target detection.  
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Figure 4.11. Data Fusion Process for the Peak RSSI Detector. In this detection mode of operation, two 
computers are required, one responsible for logging antenna bearing, and the other responsible for logging 
802.11 RSSI and Signal to Noise readings. A network time protocol service is used to accurately 
synchronize the real time clocks which run independently on each machine. The common timestamp 
information permits logged data to be joined together during post collection analysis. 
Table 4.2. Sample Timestamp-Joined Signal, Noise, and Bearing Data output by the detection sensor. 
TimeStamp BEARING SSI_SIGNAL SSI_NOISE 
10:46:11.444 0.19 -37 -94 
10:46:11.444 0.19 -36 -94 
10:46:11.444 0.19 -36 -94 
 
All collected detection sensor output samples feature the following attributes:  
 Timestamp – the time of the sample – with a resolution of 1 millisecond. 
 Bearing – the orientation of the array azimuthal heading – with a 
resolution of .0625° [14]. 
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 Signal Strength Indication – the signal strength at the antenna, in dBm, 
with a resolution of 1dBm [20], [21]. 
 Signal Strength Indication Noise Floor – The noise floor at the antenna, 
in dBm, with a resolution of 1 dBm. 
Phase I Target Detection Scheme 
With RSSI based signal and noise data it is a simple matter to calculate the signal 
to noise (SNR) ratio and then to filter the resulting SNR signal searching for peak sample 
values. Since both the signal and the noise values of the detection sensor data are 
logarithmically scaled, the SNR is calculated by subtracting the noise from the signal. We 
performed a window moving average filter against the resulting SNR signal.  
 
Figure 4.12. Polar Plots showing the LOB assigned to 6 different detection sensor runs using targets at 
varied distances and sampling frequency. 
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We also desired to know whether the choice of window size used in windowed 
moving average calculations would show any statistically significant impact on detector 
performance. We scripted the moving average filtering so that selected window sizes 
ranging from 1 (no averaging) to 255 were reported, using a window size step that double 
the window size of the previous iteration step. Following the filter step, we selected the 
windowed moving average RSSI value with the highest peak and assigned that value as 
the Line of Bearing to the detection target. Figure 4.12 features polar plots showing the 
LOB results from performing the windowed moving average filter on RSSI values from 6 
separate detection sensor rotations. 
Phase I Statistical Analysis of Baseline Metrics 
We calculated average, variance, standard deviation, and confidence interval 
values for the treatment of Moving Average Window Size, and for Target Distance from 
Detection Sensor. The statistics in the lower rows of Table 4.3 show values for the 
different Window Size treatment, with boresight mean error values shown between -
16.30° and -19.84° with a wide range of variance values, yielding 95% confidence 
intervals ranging from ±3.53° to ±6.42° from mean boresight error values. The polar plots 
in Figure 4.12 taken in conjunction with these results led us to believe that our antenna 
was either grossly misaligned during the field tests or that the antenna has a distinctive 
gain geometry skew that differs significantly from the product data sheet.  
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Table 4.3.  Phase I Statistical Results. 
 
1 15 31 63 127 255 MEAN VAR STDEV CI (95%) 
25 FT -16.94 -15.28 -16.94 -21.72 -24.72 -22.56 -19.69 14.44 3.80 3.99 
25 FT -15.50 -16.10 -14.88 -15.97 -15.97 -10.66 -14.84 4.41 2.10 2.20 
50 FT -28.75 -22.31 -23.94 -27.09 -20.53 -24.53 -24.52 9.13 3.02 3.17 
100 FT -15.69 -17.28 -18.82 -20.38 -23.37 -21.16 -19.45 7.68 2.77 2.91 
200 FT -12.69 -14.28 -14.28 -17.35 -20.60 -21.50 -16.78 13.27 3.64 3.82 
200 FT -11.87 -12.53 -11.38 -10.19 -13.85 -11.94 -11.96 1.47 1.21 1.27 
MEAN -16.91 -16.30 -16.70 -18.78 -19.84 -18.72 
    VAR 37.37 11.29 18.88 32.80 17.64 34.64 
    STDEV 6.11 3.36 4.35 5.73 4.20 5.89 
    
CI (95%) 6.42 3.53 4.56 6.01 4.41 6.18 
     
ANOVA tests conducted on the mean boresight error across different Moving 
Average Window sizes, indicate no significant difference in means collected using 
different moving average window sizes. Table 4.4 shows these ANOVA results.  
Table 4.4. ANOVA Results Comparing Mean Boresight Error. The boresight means were collected using 
different moving average window sizes. The null hypothesis is accepted; there is no significant difference 
in LOB mean error when using different moving average window sizes. 
ANOVA – Windowed Moving Average 
 SS df MS F P-value F crit 
61.16984 5 12.23397 0.480919 0.787618 2.533555 
 
The statistics in the right columns of Table 4.3 show values for boresight errors 
collected using four different Range Point distances of 25, 50, 100, and 200 feet. The 
boresight mean error values shown range between -11.96° and -24.52°, again with a wide 
range of variance values, yielding 95% confidence intervals ranging from ±1.21° to 
±3.99° from mean boresight error values. ANOVA results on the data range do indicate a 
significant difference in the boresight error means when the RF detection target is placed 
at different range points using the RSSI method. 
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Table 4.5. ANOVA results when comparing mean LOB collected at different distances from the detection 
sensor. The null hypothesis is accepted in this case, indicating that there is significant different in the 
boresight error means. 
ANOVA – Distance to Detection Sensor 
SS df MS F P-value F crit 
572.33674 5 114.4673483 13.62732 5.6491E-07 2.533554548 
 
Pairwise analysis of the means show significant differences between the 25 foot 
and 200 foot tests, as well as the 50 foot tests, and 200 foot tests. We looked more closely 
at the polar plots in Figure 4.12 and concluded that the RF detection target may have 
been too close to the detection sensor for the 25 and 50 foot tests. The dynamic range 
appears to be reduced for these plots, while the dynamic range for the 100 and 200 foot 
plots appears much wider; this is particularly easy to distinguish in the 200 foot plots, 
where a large main gain lobe is distinctly visible. We hypothesize that the significant 
mean boresight error may be due to the differences in dynamic range at different 
distances. It is a problem for future research. 
Phase I Conclusions 
The results of the LOB estimation performed using the RSSI detection methods 
showed gross errors of between 3% and 6% from true boresight angle. The results of 
polar plotting our data visually show a distinctive skew which we surmise may be due to 
antenna misalignment during data collection or a geometric defect in the antenna gain 
pattern. Since we only desired to establish baseline metrics to compare the performance 
of the monopulse enabled design, we did not devote additional effort to following up on 
these interesting questions. Our primary takeaway from the analysis of Phase I results 
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was that placing the RF detection target too close to the detection sensor may saturate the 
detector resulting in suppressed signal dynamic range.  
Phase II Experiments: Evaluating Monopulse Detection Sensor Performance 
In Phase II, we returned the detection sensor operating mode to the monopulse 
configuration, by reinstalling the dual antenna array on the device chassis, and removing 
the Linux computer from the chassis frame. Given the low dynamic range attained in the 
data collected using the close-in distances of 25 and 50 feet, we adjusted the field test 
range points to instead use range point distances of 100, 150, and 200ft in Phase II. 
The Phase II RF Detection Target 
The RF Detection Target was also swapped out in Phase II. We utilized the same 
Linux netbook that was used for RSSI logging in Phase I, due to the ability to connect an 
external antenna. In Phase II, we connected a 4dBi omnidirectional ¼ wave 2.4 GHz 
antenna to the device, as depicted by the photograph shown is Figure 4.9.b. The netbook 
was primarily selected due to the increased battery life versus the older computer that was 
used as the detection target in Phase I. This enabled us to stay fielded longer and collect a 
much larger number of detection sensor samples. 
Similar to Phase I, we ran LORCON, the C library supporting direct 802.11 
WLAN packet injection on Linux platforms. We again utilized the beacon flood tool we 
created for Phase I, which injected a continuous stream of 802.11 Management Frame 
Beacons into the 2.4 GHz environment of the field test range, avoiding the need to set up 
and deploy any additional wireless network infrastructure to the field test range. 
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Settings the Squint Angle of the Detection Sensor Antenna Array 
The process of overlapping antenna beam patterns is called squinting in the 
monopulse literature [9], [15], [10]. Theory states that optimal detection LOB resolution 
is obtained when the antennas in a monopulse array are squinted with an overlap of ½ 
beamwidth each [10]. Given that the antennas used on our array operated with 25° H-
Plane beamwidth, we configured our array to have each antenna squinted at 6.25° each, 
to arrive at the recommended 12.5° overlap.  
The rotating portion of the detection sensor chassis features antenna mounting 
assemblies with easy-to-adjust squint angles. These assemblies are called “squint turrets” 
in our design. Figure 4.13 shows the squint turrets. We used a machinist’s protractor to 
align the arrays on the detection sensor chassis.  
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Figure 4.13. Detection Sensor Showing Both Antenna A and Antenna B Squint Turrets. The inset box, 
pictured in the lower right of the figure, illustrates how the squint turrets permit the lateral positioning of 
each antenna, in addition to allowing adjustments to be made to the boresight angle orientation of each 
antenna to any azimuth bearing between 0° and 45°. The entire assembly is fastened together using a 
machine screw and wing-nut, permitting quick, in-field adjustments of antenna lateral offset and squint 
settings. 
The overlapping beam patterns form a composite beam pattern when presented to 
the ratio-detection circuitry housed within the RF electronics bay of our device. A 
schematic diagram detailing the individual beam patterns and the overlaying composite 
beam pattern is shown in Figure 4.14. According to the datasheet provided by the 
manufacturer of the array antennas, the composite beam pattern should have a main lobe 
measuring 37.5°, in practice we observed gain sensitivity beginning to peak at 25° to 30° 
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off the array boresight, yielding an actual operational beamwidth closer to 50° or 
60°.  
 
 
Figure 4.14. Schematic Diagram Detailing Antenna Beam Pattern Overlaps for Array Antennas A and B. 
The dark gray area is the ½ beamwidth overlap created by the squinted antennas. The left inset area shows 
the physical squint geometry of the arrays on the actual detection sensor. The right inset area shows the 
decomposed beam patterns of the individual antennas. 
Phase II Detection Sensor Data 
In Phase II collected data do not require the complex post-collection processing 
procedures that arose during Phase I, where it was necessary for data from disparate 
collection sensors to be joined using carefully synchronized timestamp attribution. 
Rather, the detection sensor in the Phase II monopulse configuration conveniently outputs 
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a single data stream featuring integrated timestamp, array bearing, and monopulse ratio 
measures. This results from the more tightly integrated and purpose built nature of the 
monopulse collection sensor hardware. Three samples of data output from the detection 
sensor are shown in Table 4.6 below. 
Table 4.6. Sample Monopulse Ratio Data output by the detection sensor. 
timestamp bearing avg min max window 
10:07:47:978 224.81 474.33 467 551 4 
10:07:48:010 224.81 496.33 484 548 4 
10:07:48:025 224.81 508.00 480 546 4 
 
All collected detection sensor output samples feature the following attributes:  
 Timestamp – the time of the sample – accurate to the nearest millisecond. 
 Bearing – the orientation of the array azimuthal heading – accurate to 
.0625° [14]. 
 Average Monopulse Ratio – the monopulse ratio that is the result of 
performing a windowed moving average on continuously sampled values 
resulting from microcontroller analog digital conversions of detector 
circuit analog values. The monopulse ratio is expressed in unit-less 
decibels, and has a measurement resolution of .059 dB [11]. 
 Minimum and Maximum Monopulse Ratio – the min and max monopulse 
ratio values that were recording during the present sample period. 
 The Moving Average Window Size – the moving average window size 
was configurable using the Command and Control software of the 
detection sensor. 
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As we previously alluded to, all data output from the detection sensor in the 
monopulse operating mode are spatially coherent; meaning every azimuthal-heading 
value in the output data are accompanied by monopulse data collected simultaneously 
while the detection sensor was oriented at the precise heading recorded in the data 
stream. No interpolation or time skewing is required when analyzing these data. Figure 
4.15.a shows a plot of 101,355 average monopulse ratio samples captured during a field 
test against an RF detection target located 150 Feet from the detection sensor baseline. 
This signal was normalized to unit amplitude prior to plotting. As can be seen by 
counting the peaks in Figure 4.15.a, the samples shown result from 17 complete rotations 
of the detection sensor. Figure 4.15.b shows a magnified view of the same sample data, 
plotting the signal detail for 3000 monopulse ratio samples; the data for just one complete 
detection sensor rotation. 
 
Figure 4.15. Monopulse Ratio Data for 17 Complete Detection Sensor Rotations. For this plot, the RF 
detection target was placed at Range Point B (150 feet from detection sensor). These data were normalized 
to unit amplitude prior to plotting. Figure 4.15.a shows all collected samples, while Figure 4.15.b shows a 
close up detail for only a single detection sensor rotation. The LOB for the emitter is shown as a red line in 
Figure 4.15.b. 
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Phase II Target Detection Schemes 
We attempted many signal processing techniques in an effort to discover a 
repeatable and reliable indicator of RF activity occurring within the detection sensor 
array beamwidth. Notable methods we employed include the Discrete Fourier Transform 
(DFT) and a windowed DFT technique using Welch’s method. After many attempts, we 
found no telling indicators using frequency domain representations and visualizations of 
the monopulse ratio signal.  
Focusing on time domain plots similar to those in Figure 4.15 we were able to see 
that the shape of the signal peaks showed distinct visual correlation corresponding to 
those times when an emitter was active in the detection sensor beamwidth. However, the 
signal amplitude also varied with rotation, to the point that some samples had amplitudes 
above or below those of these peak patterns, even though there was not any emitter active 
in any array antenna beam during these sample times. We looked for additional signal 
processing methods which could normalize the signal in a way that eliminated these 
amplitude discrepancies. 
Several signal statistics did produce telling results; most notably when we plotted 
the variance of the signal average amplitude, calculated using a sliding window of signal 
samples. The windowed signal variance of the monopulse ratio clearly indicated peaks 
closely corresponding to when an active transmitter was being lobed by the monopulse 
antenna array, while conveniently attenuating the problematic peaking that was 
sometimes present in the monopulse ratio signal, even when no emitter was active.  
We calculated the windowed monopulse ratio variance using Octave [22] and the 
Octave signal processing package extensions. We time-shifted the resulting variance 
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signal so that each variance value was time-aligned with the index position corresponding 
to the halfway point of the variance calculation window. Finally, we normalized the 
variance signal to unit amplitude, so we could directly overlay monopulse ratio and 
monopulse variance signals, using Octave to create comparison plots. 
In Figure 4.16.a the blue-colored signal represents the averaged monopulse ratio 
samples from two completed detection sensor rotation cycles. The red-colored signal in 
the variance plot shown in Figure 4.16.b shows the characteristic ‘twin peak’ signal 
pattern corresponding directly to the high and low amplitude peaks seen in the monopulse 
ratio data. These two patterns also correspond with the timing of the detection RF target 
entering the approximate 50° peak-to-peak beamwidth of the detection sensor antenna 
array. Figure 4.16 also displays green lines for reference, indicating where the actual 
detection target LOB is found in the context of these signal traces.  
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Figure 4.16. Monopulse Ratio Windowed Variance for Two Complete Detection Sensor Rotations. The 
monopulse ratio was collecting using a 4 point moving average, while the Monopulse Variance was 
collected using a 64 point moving average. In both figures, the points where the emitter target enters the 
beam are clearly visible. The variance statistic was found to be a reliable detector for determining when an 
emitter is operating within the array beamwidth. The actual detection target LOB is shown by the green line 
on the left side detection, while the LOB is shown highlighted in red on the right side detection.  
It is interesting to note that the actual LOB does not fall exactly where the two 
main lobes of the monopulse ratio signal switch from a ratio dominated by Array 
Antenna A to a ratio dominated by Array Antenna B. Rather, a distinctive right-shifted 
bias can be observed, as seen in the figure. We attribute this to mismatches in the stripline 
microwave transmission channels on the PCB we implemented for the detection sensor. 
One array antenna experiences more transmission channel loss than the other. Figure 4.17 
depicts a detail plot illustrating this observed bias.  
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Figure 4.17. Detail Plot Illustrating Bias Observed in Monopulse Ratio Mean. In a properly matched and 
tuned detection sensor, the monopulse ratio amplitude transition and the bearing to the RF Detection Target 
should closely align. In our system there was a distinctive offset biased towards Antenna A. We attributed 
the bias to flaws in our implementation of microwave transmission lines on the detection sensor PCB. We 
did not explore this bias in greater detail, since we also observed that the Left and Right monopulse 
variance peaks were still highly correlated with the actual bearing to the RF Detection Target.  
We did not fully explore more test cases that could assist in further attributing the 
detection sensor bias, since we also observed that, despite this bias, the actual target 
emitter LOB aligns very closely with the point lying half the distance between the peaks 
of the main lobes of the monopulse windowed variance signal. Having made this 
observation, we next set out to calculate the LOB estimate using the indices of the 
variance signal peaks, which we manually identified using the plots we made using 
102 
 
 
Octave. These indices directly correspond to index values in a synchronous heading 
signal that is also an output of the detection sensor.  
Heading Interpolation Using a Windowed Variance Peak-to-Peak Detector  
Given that we can visually identify peaks in the monopulse windowed variance 
signal, and given that the signal array indices denoting the peak values also index directly 
into a time-synchronous heading signal which stores the antenna chassis azimuthal 
bearing, it is a simple operation to lookup the headings for each peak, and then to 
interpolate a heading for the point located half way between these bracketing bearings. 
This point is what we call the Line of Bearing to the Detection Target. Equation 1 
describes the simple calculation that is necessary to calculate the detection target LOB 
estimate. In the equation, θRS is the Right Side Peak Heading Angle and θLS is the Left 
Side Peak Heading Angle, in respect to the position of each peak on the signal plot 
horizontal axis. 
𝐿𝑂𝐵 =  
𝜃𝑅𝑆  −  𝜃𝐿𝑆
2
 (1) 
Obtaining the resulting LOB estimate then permits us to compare the estimate 
directly against the known LOB to the target emitter, the position of which we surveyed 
when we set up the field test range. We can calculate the difference between these two 
bearings to produce an error signal, on which we can perform a statistical analysis that 
indicates the effective performance of the WIDAR system monopulse detection sensor.  
The manual procedure relies on the signals analyst to visually examine the 
processed monopulse variance signal to identify the characteristic twin peaks produced 
when an active emitter is operating in the detector array beamwidth. Figure 4.18 shows 
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polar plots for the results of performing the manual procedure on 6 separate sensor data 
collection runs. 
 
Figure 4.18. Polar Plots of Sampled Monopulse Array Measurements. The plots were created by manually 
performing interpolation using the Windowed Variance Peak to Peak Method. The Octave command line 
was used to perform the calculations, with visual inspection performed on Octave plots. 
As shown by the LOB values listed in Figure 4.18, the results of using the manual 
peak identification show promise, the mean error for the 6 plots was .05°; well under the 
predicted theoretical performance of the monopulse array. In all of our experiments the 
true LOB was at heading 0.00°.  
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This method was then automated using the FindPeaks() command found in 
the Octave signal processing package [22]. A block diagram of the automated detection 
process is shown in Figure 4.19. Before inputting signal data into the peak detector 
shown in the diagram, it is necessary to first segment the monopulse ratio signal into 
discrete blocks of signal samples grouped by 360 ° rotations. Signal data are then run 
through the detector blocks, where the windowed variance calculation is performed, 
along with time shifting and signal amplitude normalization.  
For our research we simply ran the FindPeaks() function against the 
normalized signal, after tuning the function to select peaks above a tunable amplitude 
parameter. In our testing, we selected .82 as the peak height parameter, and 200 samples 
for the minimum inter-peak spacing. This process found 100% of the 17 peak pairs in our 
data sample, with zero type I or type II errors. We did include logic in our detector to 
report any rotation segments where the peak detector located more or less than the 
required 2 windowed variance peak values. 
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Figure 4.19. Block Diagram Detailing the Windowed Variance Peak to Peak Detector. 
Statistical Analysis of the Windowed Variance Peak to Peak Detector  
We processed monopulse ratio data collected from our sensor through the detector 
to test the LOB interpolation performance. We also desired to know whether the choice 
of window size used in windowed variance calculations would show any statistically 
significant impact on detector performance. We selected window sizes ranging from 32 
to 256 (in steps of 32 samples each), and then created an Octave script that would run the 
detector interpolation algorithm described in Figure 4.19, incrementing the variance 
window size with each iteration.  
Table 4.7 shows mean boresight error values ranging from -1.40° to -1.80° with 
variance values tightly grouped about the mean, yielding 95% confidence intervals 
ranging from ±.26° to ±.49 from mean boresight error values. Portions of the confidence 
interval overlap with the boresight error of ±1.25° predicted by monopulse theory. 
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Furthermore, the low mean boresight error of the monopulse array stands in stark contrast 
to the much larger errors observed in data collected using the sequential lobing scheme of 
Phase I.  
Table 4.7. Statistical Analysis of Interpolated LOB Estimated Using Windowed Variance Peak to Peak 
Detector. 
 
32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 
MEAN -1.41 -1.40 -1.45 -1.50 -1.80 -1.66 -1.64 -1.75 
VAR 0.65 0.55 0.52 0.26 0.19 0.32 0.76 0.91 
STDEV 0.81 0.74 0.72 0.51 0.43 0.56 0.87 0.95 
CI (95%) 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.26 0.22 0.29 0.45 0.49 
MEAN - CI -1.83 -1.78 -1.82 -1.76 -2.02 -1.95 -2.09 -2.24 
MEAN + CI -1.00 -1.02 -1.08 -1.24 -1.57 -1.37 -1.19 -1.26 
MIN -2.53 -2.94 -3.09 -2.53 -2.91 -2.75 -3.35 -3.38 
MAX 0.35 0.04 -0.16 -0.56 -1.10 -0.56 -0.25 0.44 
RANGE 2.88 2.97 2.94 1.97 1.81 2.19 3.10 3.82 
SKEW 0.90 0.41 -0.58 0.06 -0.83 0.02 -0.04 0.53 
Avg Error Arc (Inches) -44.42 -43.96 -45.45 -47.02 -56.39 -52.21 -51.61 -54.93 
Avg Error/Tgt Dist (%) -2.47% -2.44% -2.53% -2.61% -3.13% -2.90% -2.87% -3.05% 
 
Table 4.8. ANOVA Results Comparing Boresight Error Means. The null hypothesis is accepted – no 
significant mean inequality exists. 
ANOVA – Peak-to-Peak Windowed Variance 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 2.889797059 7 0.412828 0.797871 0.590459 2.081872 
 
It is interesting to note that similar to Phase I, ANOVA tests on the choice of 
window size parameter indicate that no significant mean difference is attributable to the 
variance calculation window size. This is an important discovery since any operational 
system would benefit from the performance increase achieved by selecting a smaller 
variance calculation window, with the aim of reducing computation complexity. 
107 
 
 
This analysis was performed on the 101,355 sample dataset we collected when the 
RF detection target was placed at the 150 foot Range Point. For reference we have 
converted the boresight angle errors shown in Table 4.7 into distance measures relative to 
the 150 foot target offset. These values are shown in the bottom 4 rows of Table 4.7. For 
example, consider the 32 point variance window size having a mean boresight error of.-
1.41°. This rotational error translates to an arc distance of 44.42 inches, given a radius of 
150 feet from detection sensor to the RF detection target. This value expressed as a 
percentage of distance to target is also shown in Table 4.7. For the 32 point window, the 
percentage shown is -2.47%.  
Heading Interpolation Using a Matched Filter Detector 
We next modified the Windowed Variance Peak to Peak detector to include a 
matched filter. The idea behind this change was that in a real world situation multiple 
targets and increased environmental noise would hinder the performance of any detector 
based purely on the windowed variance peak to peak method. Instead we chose to test 
whether a matched filter, which brings the capability to detect signals buried in noise, 
would also provide similar LOB interpolation performance. The modified detector block 
diagram is shown in Figure 4.20. 
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Figure 4.20. Block Diagram of the Matched Filter Detector. This is a modified version of the Windowed 
Variance Peak-to-Peak detector, where a Matched Filter is used to correlate signal data with a target image 
of the Peak-to-Peak signal pattern. Peak detection is then used to identify highly correlated regions of the 
signal which are then run through Bearing Lookup and Interpolation blocks to estimate a Target LOB. 
In this detector we input the characteristic twin peaks, seen in the windowed 
variance signal when a target is active, as the target signal we want the matched filter to 
correlate with. There are screen shots of the matched filter being identified and selected 
using Octave shown in Figure 4.21. Due to how the matched filter correlation is 
performed in Octave, the actual target signal used in filtering was a time-reversed copy of 
the originally selected target signal. 
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Figure 4.21. Using Octave to Identify and Isolate the Matched Filter Correlation Target Pattern. 
We used the Octave Filter() command to run the correlation filter against the 
same 101,355 sample dataset we used when assessing the previous Peak to Peak detector 
treatment. A notable difference being that there is no longer a need to perform the 
rotation segmenting that was utilized in the last detector. This method could also be 
performed in real time on detection sensor data, assuming the proper optimizations were 
implemented.  
The matched filter produces a separate signal containing amplitude peaks at 
sample points where the signal is strongly correlated with the matched filter target signal. 
The matched filter signal then enters a peak detector, once again implemented using the 
FindPeaks() function in the Octave signal processing package. Figure 4.22.a shows a 
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plot of monopulse ratio data corresponding to 3 complete detection sensor rotations. In 
Figure 4.22.b we show the signals output from the various stages of the matched filter 
detector blocks. The windowed variance of the monopulse ratio signal is plotted using the 
red lines in Figure 4.22.b, while the matched filter correlation signal is plotted using 
light-green lines.  
 
Figure 4.22. The matched filter output signal is shown in green in Figure 4.22.b. The peak detection 
algorithm uses a cutoff amplitude of .82 and produces a detected peaks signal. Detected peaks are marked 
by blue line segments in Figure 4.22.b. The index of the detected peaks are passed to the LOB calculation 
blocks, where the peaks are used to lookup bearing information for each peak and the corresponding 
bearing information for the opposite peak located at the beginning of the matched filter. 
The matched filter signal also appeared to strongly correlate with any side lobes 
located near the variance signal main lobes, hence we had greater difficulty tuning the 
peak detector in this stage of our detector design. We selected filter parameters of .82 for 
minimum peak height, and again used 200 as the minimum sample spacing between 
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peaks. After careful tuning we had zero false positives, but did track several false 
negatives.  
Matched Filter Method Statistical Analysis 
We processed monopulse ratio data collected from our sensor through the detector 
to test the LOB interpolation performance. Since this method still integrated a windowed 
variance signal feeding the matched detector, we followed steps similar to the prior 
detector analysis, selecting window sizes ranging from 32 to 256 (in steps of 32 samples 
each), and then creating an Octave script that would run the detector interpolation 
algorithm using all these window sizes.  
Table 4.9 shows mean boresight error values ranging from 0.98° to 5.86° with 
variance values tightly grouped about the mean except for the 256 point windowed 
variance treatment. The boresight error values have 95% confidence intervals ranging 
from ±.50° to ±1.33 from mean boresight error values. Most average values are much 
larger than those mean error values estimated using the Windowed Variance Peak-to-
Peak detector, and larger variances are also observed.  
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Table 4.9. Statistical Analysis of Interpolated LOB Estimated Using Windowed Variance Matched Filter 
Detector. 
 
32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 
MEAN 0.98 2.56 1.62 2.32 3.45 3.95 5.86 4.36 
VAR 1.49 1.26 0.96 1.20 1.29 2.05 1.86 6.69 
STDEV 1.22 1.12 0.98 1.10 1.13 1.43 1.36 2.59 
CI (95%) 0.63 0.58 0.50 0.56 0.58 0.74 0.70 1.33 
MEAN - CI 0.35 1.99 1.12 1.75 2.86 3.21 5.16 3.03 
MEAN + CI 1.61 3.14 2.12 2.88 4.03 4.68 6.56 5.69 
MIN -0.84 0.13 0.19 0.69 1.13 1.13 3.03 -0.06 
MAX 3.72 4.63 4.16 5.54 6.38 7.35 9.19 9.19 
RANGE 4.56 4.50 3.97 4.85 5.25 6.22 6.16 9.25 
SKEW 0.58 -0.24 0.77 1.32 0.60 0.35 0.30 -0.13 
 
An ANOVA test performed against the boresight mean error data indicates 
significant mean error differences exist between boresight errors. The ANOVA test on 
boresight mean error is shown in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10. ANOVA Results Comparing Boresight Error Means. The null hypothesis is rejected – at least 
one mean inequality exists.  
ANOVA – Matched Filter on Windowed Variance 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 458.95 7.00 65.56 6.87 0.00 2.08 
 
Pairwise analysis using Tukey Kramer multiple comparisons indicates that the 
larger window sizes of 224 and 256 are significantly different than boresight errors 
collected using smaller window sizes. Since smaller window sizes yield boresight errors 
that are smaller with tighter variances we conclude that a detector employing smaller 
detection windows offers statistically significant improvements over larger window sizes. 
Figure 4.23 plots the boresight error mean and standard deviation for all windowed 
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variance window sizes. The results of Tukey Kramer ranged q test for multiple mean 
comparisons are shown in Table 4.11. 
. 
 
Figure 4.23. Mean and Standard Deviation Differences for Windowed Variance Window Sizes. 
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Table 4.11. Tukey Kramer Multiple Comparisons on Pairwise Mean Differences (Ranged q Value = 4.363; 
df = 128). 
Window Pair Mean Diff Critical Range (q = 4.363) Results 
32 to 64 1.58 3.27 FALSE 
32 to 96 0.64 3.27 FALSE 
32 to 128 1.34 3.27 FALSE 
32 to 160 2.47 3.27 FALSE 
32 to 192 2.97 3.27 FALSE 
32 to 224 4.88 3.27 TRUE 
32 to 256 3.38 3.27 TRUE 
64 to 96 0.94 3.27 FALSE 
64 to 128 0.25 3.27 FALSE 
64 to 160 0.88 3.27 FALSE 
64 to 192 1.38 3.27 FALSE 
64 to 224 3.30 3.27 TRUE 
64 to 256 1.79 3.27 FALSE 
96 to 128 0.70 3.27 FALSE 
96 to 160 1.83 3.27 FALSE 
96 to 192 2.33 3.27 FALSE 
96 to 224 4.24 3.27 TRUE 
96 to 256 2.74 3.27 FALSE 
128 to 160 1.13 3.27 FALSE 
128 to 192 1.63 3.27 FALSE 
128 to 224 3.54 3.27 TRUE 
128 to 256 2.04 3.27 FALSE 
160 to 192 0.50 3.27 FALSE 
160 to 224 2.41 3.27 FALSE 
160 to 256 0.91 3.27 FALSE 
192 to 224 1.91 3.27 FALSE 
192 to 256 0.41 3.27 FALSE 
224 to 256 1.50 3.27 FALSE 
 
Phase II Conclusions 
Both LOB Detectors we analyzed in Phase II out-performed our baseline metrics 
collected from the sequential lobing scheme used in Phase I. The Windowed Variance 
Peak-to-Peak detector provided consistent mean boresight errors, and standard deviations 
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of 1° or less for all variance window sizes. The performance of this detector very nearly 
matched that of the ±1.25° that textbook theory estimated for a device with the 
beamwidth of the antennas that were used.  
In our experiments with the matched filter detector we observed similar boresight 
errors, at least when those estimates were performed using smaller variance calculation 
windows. The overall mean and overall variance for boresight error for this detector were 
higher than the detector using only the window variance peaks for LOB estimation. 
However, the addition of a matched filter correlator in this detector should offer superior 
detector performance in noisy environments, or in multiple target environments. This is 
left as a question for future research. 
Recommendations for Continued Exploration 
We explored the capabilities of a detection sensor designed to detect and estimate 
a Line of Bearing for targets operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band. While the results of 
testing the monopulse array concept do show promising LOB estimation capabilities 
having accuracies that could permit a system to detect and spatially attribute a wireless 
attacker, many questions remain unanswered. We have the following recommendations 
for those wishing to conduct further research in this area: 
 Explore Software Defined Radio (SDR) tools for next generation of detection 
sensor. Devices like the HackRF [23] and the USRP-B210 [24] offer technical 
advances that far exceed our current generation detection sensor in terms of 
sensitivity and detection bandwidth. These products can operate in RF bands 
from baseband to 6GHz with 70MHz sampling bandwidths. An SDR 
toolchain would support true Sum/Difference on complex signal samples to be 
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performed, enabling the more commonly implemented forms of monopulse 
processors to be developed, purely in software. Furthermore, when couple 
with tools such as GNU Radio [25], the capability to sample spectrum using 
monopulse methods and demodulate wireless network traffic becomes 
available, presenting many advancement opportunities.  
 Experiment with Phased Array detection sensors. Utilizing the SDR tools just 
mentioned, an interesting research area would be to implement a phased array 
radar system using beam/null shaping principles and techniques. Research 
such as this could lead to far more sensitive detectors than those we presented, 
and could potentially eliminate the need for a mechanically steered chassis. 
 Research the potential for miniaturizing an ISM band monopulse sensor to be 
a drone payload. RF environmental surveys could be performed using a single 
drone, where our system currently would depend on a network of fixed 
position cooperative sensors to estimate angular LOB to any detected target. A 
mobile sensor could integrate readings from multiple spatial locations which 
could dramatically increase location estimation accuracy. 
 Many other avenues of exploration exist, such as multiple target detection and 
tracking, and an entire treatment of counter measures an attacker could 
employ to defeat detection, such as deployment of decoys and randomized 
slow-speed wireless traffic patterning.  
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Abstract 
Our research is focused on the development of a system of sensor devices 
employing monopulse radar methods to detect and spatially attribute RF targets 
transmitting in the 2.4 GHz ISM band. The intent is to deploy this type of system on or 
about a facility to protect the premises from overt or covert cyber-attacks exploiting 
wireless vectors. In this paper, we seek to focus on deployment and operational questions 
we have regarding our detection system, with the aim of arriving at a coherent strategy 
for system operation. To answer such questions, we present a simulation tool with the 
purpose of exploring candidate sensor deployment and operational detection schemes. 
We present simulation scenarios which vary sensor placement, modes of sensor 
operation, and sensor mechanical capabilities. Quantitative analytics accompany each 
scenario. We then present a study of position estimation error, where we program 
detection sensors to simulate the mean Line-of-Bearing estimation errors we obtained 
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from a prototype sensor during real field tests. We conclude with several 
recommendations for an effective protection strategy, based on results obtained from our 
simulations and scenario analysis.  
Introduction 
In previous work, we presented our design for a system of detection devices 
employing monopulse radar methods to detect and spatially attribute RF targets 
transmitting in the 2.4 GHz ISM band [1], [2]. We designed the detection sensor of that 
system with the capability to assign a Line-of-Bearing (LOB) to any RF targets actively 
emitting within the operational range of the sensor [3]. In conjunction with the system 
design and concept of operation detailed in that study, we also presented an actual 
implementation of a research prototype.  
The sensor prototype featured a mechanically steered antenna array alongside 
integrated monopulse processing hardware and software. The intent was to deploy a 
cooperative network of these sensors about the external vicinity of any facility we desired 
to protect from stand-off wireless attacks. The sensors would scan the external grounds of 
the facility while looking for active wireless transmissions. They were intended to 
provide the increased situational awareness necessary to support decision tools that could 
make a determination whether any detected activity was part of an unauthorized network 
intrusion. While we described a conceptual deployment scheme indicating the 
rudimentary placement of detection sensors, we did not provide an in-depth treatment or 
recommend any strategy for effective device deployment and operation on or around the 
Facility Under Protection (FUP).  
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In a follow up paper, we discussed the results of performance tests conducted 
using the research prototype in a tightly controlled field setting [2]. During field tests, the 
prototype sensor showed the promise of producing reasonable target LOB estimates; 
however, we also concluded that many technical challenges still lay ahead before such 
devices were deemed effective for real world facility protection. The data obtained during 
our system field trials provided insight into how well an actual device might perform in a 
real facility protection context, in terms of performance and device accuracy. 
In this paper, we put these data to valuable use; feeding them as inputs into a 
parametric simulation tool we developed to model our detection system, enabling us to 
research questions about how best to deploy and operate a system with the capabilities we 
designed. We show how the simulation environment can be a useful tool, providing us 
the liberty to set aside many of the technical challenges arising from the physics of real 
world RF detection; instead permitting us to focus on the development of a strategy for 
facility protection using our system. Any strategy research can become very broad if not 
constrained. To maintain focus in our work, we chose to constrain our research to 
questions aimed at guiding operational and deployment aspects of our system: 
 How well would a network of our prototype sensors (as implemented) 
actually perform? 
 What are the marginal performance gains achieved when mechanical 
enhancements are made to our detection sensors?  
 How many sensors should be deployed about a facility to ensure adequate 
protection? 
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 Should sensors be mast mounted a distance away from the FUP, or should 
they be concealed on the rooftop of the FUP?  
 Can modulating the WLAN data rate play a useful role in ensuring full 
attacker geo-location and spatial attribution? 
 What is the mean position estimate error we can expect when multiple 
detection sensor LOB estimates are integrated to triangulate a detected 
attack? 
By using our simulation tool to explore these questions we begin to gain 
important knowledge about how best to protect a facility from attack using our system. 
We next present the simulation architecture in more detail, prior to embarking on an 
examination of the actual simulation experiments we performed to explore the strategy 
questions we outlined above.  
Simulation Model Architecture 
Our simulation model is a custom written tool implemented using the Microsoft 
Visual Studio .NET Framework 4.5 toolchain. The software features a reusable object 
model that is both scalable and configurable, implementing simulation constructs for all 
of the pieces at play in our wireless attack research. Abstractions exist to model and 
simulate the facility targeted by wireless attacks, the detection sensors that defend the 
facility, and the adversary who carries out wireless attacks. In addition to those primary 
model objects, many other classes were implemented for use in the development of 
realistic wireless attack and defend simulation environments: network adapters, servers, 
workstations, and laptops, and most importantly, the data files residing on the files 
systems of these simulated devices. In all of our simulation scenarios, these data files are 
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the primary target of the adversary, who seeks to steal the files without being detected by 
our sensor system. 
The simulation model integrates a custom geographic information system (GIS) 
engine that is capable of spatially referencing and visually displaying any of the sensor 
placement and adversary attack scenarios we wish to simulate in this research. Figure 5.1 
shows a screen capture taken from a running simulation run. 
 
Figure 5.1. Screen Capture from Running Simulation Software. In this scenario, four wireless detection 
sensors (shown as red directional antennas) are actively scanning for wireless attacks against a simulated 
facility, represented by the green rectangle. The sensor on the lower left corner of the facility has detected 
an active attacker within the scanning beam of the detection sensor. In our simulation, detected attacks are 
indicated by changing the scanning beam color from gold to red. The attacker is shown represented as a 
flashing star, in the lower left hand corner of the simulation window. The current simulation timestamp is 
displayed in the lower right corner of the simulation window.  
Simulating Random Arrivals using a Discrete Poisson Probability Model 
A core requirement for our simulation tool is the capability to generate randomly 
occurring attacks against the wireless access point of the facility. These attacks must be 
randomly distributed, both temporally and spatially. Our simulation tool integrates a 
Poisson Arrival Generator to support randomized discrete arrivals. An example of a 
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random discrete arrival that we would generate for the simulation would be the number of 
attacks per year against a simulated facility, or the number of computers operated on a 
simulated facility network. We based the randomized arrival engine on prior work we 
developed as part of external research [4]. The simulation engine generates random 
arrivals using a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) as the input to a Poisson 
distributed Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF), as shown in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2. Conceptual Diagram of the Simulation Tool Poisson Arrival Engine. The PRNG generates a 
pseudo random number which is used to choose a discrete value from a Poisson CDF. The CDF table is 
generated at simulation startup based on a Mean Arrivals parameter dependent upon the average number of 
arrivals per time period for some simulation artifact.  
In the figure, the CDF depicted is generated during the initialization of the 
simulation by first iterating through potential discrete arrival possibilities and calculating 
the Poisson distributed probability for each discrete arrival. The only input to the Poisson 
probability function is the mean arrivals we desire to see for some aspect of our 
simulation. Equation 1 shows the Probability Distribution Function (PDF) for the 
Discrete Poisson Distribution.  
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The probability that is generated for each discrete possibility during each iteration 
step is added to a summary table maintaining a running sum of the cumulative discrete 
arrival probability. Each row in this table is indexed by the discrete arrival count value 
corresponding to the probability that was just added to the running sum. This process 
continues until the CDF sum saturates near a very close single precision floating-point 
approximation of cumulative probability equal to one.  
At this point, any probability value we generate, for example a random probability 
generated by the PRNG, can be used to reverse-lookup a discrete arrival value from the 
CDF summary table. We utilize this method; randomly generating a probability value, 
followed by looking up the discrete arrival value for that random probability, to generate 
many types of random arrival events in our simulation. The PDF and CDF distributions 
are plotted in Figure 5.3. Figure 5.3.a and Figure 5.3.b display the PDF and the CDF for a 
Mean Arrivals value of 5. Figure 5.3.c shows a plot of 10000 arrivals looked up from the 
CDF Summary Table using PRNG values as index. After only 10000 samples, the PDF 
can clearly be seen emerging from the data. 
𝑃(𝑛) =  
𝜇𝑛 ×  𝑒−𝜇
𝑛!
 (1) 
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Figure 5.3. Discrete Poisson Probability Distribution Function and Cumulative Distribution Function. 
Figure 5.3.a shows the Probability Distribution Function (PDF) for Mean Arrival (μ = 5). An iterative 
procedure is used to generate probabilities for discrete arrival values. Figure 5.3.b shows the Discrete 
Poisson Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for Mean Arrival (μ = 5). A value generated between 0.0 
and 1.0 by the PRNG is used to perform a reverse lookup onto the curve. The lookup value determines the 
number of discrete arrivals that are randomly generated for a given simulation state. Figure 5.3.c shows a 
comparison plot depicting Mean Distribution from 10000 Runs of the Random Arrival Generator. The Run 
Generator was configured with a Mean Arrival Rate of 5. The results should closely align with the 
Probability of Arrival Distribution shown in Figure 5.3.a, and they do, with an observed Mean Arrival Rate 
of 4.9925 after 10000 samples. In the Discrete Poisson Distribution, the population mean and population 
variance are always equal to the input mean arrival rate parameter. 
Simulation Logical Objects 
We next turn to describing the simulation tool software. The software architecture 
is logically divided into object classes responsible for implementing specific detection 
system functionality. Our objective was to equip the software with model elements for 
each of the important classes of objects in our detection system. Important components 
are the Facility we wish to protect with the detection system, the Detection Sensors we 
will deploy on the facility, and the Adversary, who carries out facility wireless attacks. 
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Simulating the Facility Under Protection 
The Facility Under Protection (FUP) or just simply “facility” serves as the target 
of attack during our simulation runs. The facility is also the logical container for a variety 
of simulation sub-system components as shown in Figure 5.4. At simulation startup, a 
single facility object is created. The Poisson Arrival Generator is then used to generate a 
random number of internal servers, based on a mean number of computers the simulated 
facility is programmed to contain. The mean facility computer count is input by the user 
before the simulation is run. Each server, in turn, generates a random internal file system, 
containing randomly sized data files, each with a randomly assigned target value.  
 
Figure 5.4. Simulation Facility Architecture. The facility logically contains the detection system – with 
detection sensors and command and control functionality – as well as a wireless access point vulnerable to 
external wireless attack, and a network of servers housing sensitive systems and data which are targeted for 
attack by the simulation adversary. 
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We assigned classification values to the data files in the simulation model to 
simulate the variety of files that are commonly found on computer networks, from 
mundane system files, to highly sensitive commercial databases, to the classified secrets 
maintained by nation states. Enabling a data classification system in the simulation 
permits the running of scoring schemes against simulation results to compute, for 
example, a post-simulation severity score for each successful attack against the FUP. Our 
model currently contains the following target file classifications: 
 Spam = 0 
 Unclassified_Non_Critical = 1 
 Unclassified_Critical = 2 
 Classified_Secret = 3 
 Classified_Top_Secret = 4 
 Classified_Ultra_Secret = 5 
 Classified_Apocalyptic_Event = 6 
To expose the necessary facility vulnerabilities described by our threat model [1], 
we equip the target facility with a Wireless Access Point (WAP) and provide for the 
WAP to be topologically linked with the common network resources shared by the 
facility file system servers.  
Additionally, and most importantly, the FUP in our simulation is initialized with a 
set of detection sensors. The number of detection sensors and their geometric placement 
on the actual facility are configurable and initialized at simulation startup. Each detection 
sensor reports to a Detection Command and Control (DCC) object in our simulation 
model, as shown in Figure 5.4. The DCC serves as the central point for attack detection 
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data collection, and is also a convenient location in the software model to place data 
logging functionality that is valuable for assessing the performance of simulation 
scenarios. 
Simulating Detection System Sensors 
The simulation detection sensors are designed to model the mechanical and 
physical behavior of our real world prototype, while at the same time implementing the 
monopulse lobing detection capabilities our simulation is premised upon. Figure 5.5 
displays key details for a typical simulation detection sensor. For our simulation, each 
detection sensor has parametrically programmable rotation RPM and scanning 
beamwidth. The initial boresight heading and the detection scan rotation direction 
(clockwise or counter-clockwise) can be programmed independently for each simulated 
sensor. 
 
Figure 5.5. Conceptual Diagram of Simulation Detection Sensor and Beam Pattern. One or more detection 
sensors are actively rotated during the simulation. Each sensor has configuration parameters controlling the 
rate of azimuthal rotation, the detection beamwidth, starting boresight bearing, and operating mode 
(PAN_THEN_SCAN or CONTINUOUS). In Figure 5.5.b, the detection sensor has detected an active 
attack. Every detection sensor can sense any wireless transmissions active within the detection beam 
boundary. The detection sensor returns a Line-of-Bearing estimate for any detected target. The estimate is 
subject to random estimation error about a programmable mean boresight error. The LOB estimate is 
relayed to the detection command and control system. 
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In order to accurately model our functional prototype, we included several 
behaviors in the simulation sensors that control how detection scanning is performed. Our 
prototype suffered from electrical motor noise issues on the control data bus when the 
device was actually rotating [1]. This physically prevented our real world device from 
actually performing a detection scan while at the same time actively rotating the array. 
We termed this mode of operation “Pan Then Scan”, and included functionality to model 
Pan Then Scan in our simulated detection sensors. The Pan Then Scan mode featured 
several additional configuration parameters, allowing the user to specify the simulation 
time duration of the pan operation, the detection scan operation, as well as the number of 
degrees to step the boresight heading during the pan portion of the Pan Then Scan mode. 
Of course, since simulated detection sensors do not physically suffer the actual 
electrical noise issues inherent to our test implementation, we also included a Continuous 
Scan mode of operation in our sensor model. We designed our model to include both 
behaviors with a comparison scenario in mind. The scenarios section of this paper details 
the performance comparison results observed during our simulated comparison of the Pan 
Then Scan Mode and Continuous Scan Mode of operation. 
Simulating the Adversary 
The attacking adversary in our simulation directs wireless attacks against the 
FUP. Attacks are conducted using a simulated laptop, connecting to the target facility 
using a Wireless LAN Adapter. The attack laptop WLAN Adapter has a configurable 
mean file download data rate. Figure 5.6 depicts the conceptual model describing the 
Simulation Adversary. At simulation startup, the simulation runtime randomly generates 
the number of attacks that will occur during the course of the simulation run time.  
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Figure 5.6. The Simulation Adversary  
The randomized attack times generated by the simulation runtime then drive the 
creation of a single adversary simulation object for each random attack time. The 
adversary is initialized with the time of attack and the facility to target. The adversary 
randomly generates a skill level for herself, and then proceeds to plan an attack, based on 
the internally generated skill level, against the target facility. We have included the 
following Adversary Skill Levels in our simulation model: 
 LookingForWiFiToCheckEmail = 0 
 ScriptKiddie = 1 
 DisgruntledFormerEmployee = 2 
 SysAdmin = 3 
 PenTester = 4 
 Ninja = 5 
 NationState = 6 
132 
 
 
Skill level drives the attack planning strategy executed by the adversary. The 
higher the skill level assigned by the simulation system, the more likely the adversary is 
to target sensitive data and execute increasingly sophisticated attacks. For example, if an 
attacker is generated with the relatively low level of Script Kiddie (level 1 attacker), she 
may be more inclined to simply randomly select files, and may spend excessive amounts 
of time actively connected to the FUP WLAN system. Continuing the example, an 
attacker assigned the Nation State (level 6 attacker) may carefully select the highest value 
target files, and may also choose target files which are downloaded the fastest, to 
minimize detection risk. Our adversary generator can be configured to preset the skill 
level of the attacker, or to parametrically generate a skill level from an Average Attacker 
Skill Level value set at system startup. This mean value will then be input into the 
simulation system Poisson Arrival Generator, and a random skill level is then assigned to 
the adversary.    
The Simulation Clock 
The entire simulation progresses from a start time to an end time by means of a 
simulation clock commonly referenced by all simulation entities. The simulation clock is 
the engine that causes the simulation objects to change state from one time instant to the 
next. The clock functions by raising a software tick event. Each element holding a 
reference pointer to the simulation clock is notified of the clock tick event, and takes 
action dependent upon the programmatic behavior setup for that object. Figure 5.7 
illustrates conceptually how the simulation clock relays clock tick events to simulation 
objects.  
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Figure 5.7. Simulation Clock – All Simulation Objects maintain an internal reference to the Master 
Simulation Clock. Upon receiving a Clock Tick Signal, each simulation object behaves according to the 
internal programming logic of the simulation object. For example, a detection sensor might rotate an 
amount based on the time since the last clock signal, or an adversary might launch a pre-planned attack. 
The user can configure the clock to raise tick events with any level of granularity 
desired for simulation purposes. We have selected a 20ms time base for our research 
runs. Therefore, each clock tick increments the simulation state by 20ms per clock tick. 
The interval between clock ticks is also configurable, allowing for simulation time to be 
sped up or slowed down as appropriate. Also, the direction of simulation time flow is 
user changeable, permitting the simulation to be run in reverse or forward time change 
directions. 
The simulation clock is initialized at simulation startup with a start time and end 
time in system date format. The simulation clock can be positioned programmatically to 
any time point, in between the start end time span. We have somewhat arbitrarily chosen 
January 01, 2020 to December 31, 2020 as the start and end times for all of our 
simulation runs.  
Positioning the simulation time will result in all simulation child objects taking on 
the state reflective of that time point. For example, the rotating detection sensors will 
calculate the current detection boresight heading for any time point provided by the 
simulation clock. This is possible since each detection sensor is aware of the initial 
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startup boresight heading, and our simulation makes the assumption that rotation rates are 
constant, therefore the future boresight bearing can be deterministically computed for any 
simulation time point.  
Simulation Scenarios 
Scenario 1 – Simulating the Prototype Detection Sensor Implementation 
The objective for Scenario 1 was the establishment of baseline performance 
parameters for the detection system. For the baseline, we chose to model the prototype 
sensor we created for field testing our system. This was driven by an interest in 
quantifying how that sensor would actually perform in a real facility protection 
environment. This experiment has two treatments (Treatment I and Treatment II), each 
simulating a single detection sensor operating in two different scanning modes.  
For Treatment I, we configured the simulation software to operate a single sensor 
with performance characteristics matching that of our prototype implementation. We 
previously described how the prototype sensor could only operate in the Pan Then Scan 
mode of operation, due to electrical noise issues. The array steering sub-system on that 
sensor supported rotation scan speeds of 6RPM. 
For Treatment II, we configured the simulation software to operate the same 
detection sensor, keeping all parameters the same, except for enabling a continuous 
scanning capability. We hypothesized that there would be a significant performance gain, 
in terms of the number of attacks detected by the system. Key parameters for Treatment I 
and Treatment II are listed in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. Treatment Parameters for Scenario 1 Comparison Study. In Scenario 1, we wish to identify 
whether there is a performance gain achieved when a single detection sensor is upgraded from Pan Then 
Scan mode of operation to a Continuous detection scanning capability. The different Scan Modes are 
highlighted in yellow.  
Scenario Parameter Treatment I Treatment II 
Simulation Duration 1 Year 1 Year 
Simulation Runs 538 538 
Facility Average Attacks Per Year 5 5 
Detection Sensors Deployed 1 1 
Detection Sensor RPM 6 6 
Detection Sensor Beamwidth 25 25 
Detection Sensor Scan Mode PAN_THEN_SCAN CONTINUOUS 
Detection Capability LINE_OF_BEARING LINE_OF_BEARING 
 
Results and Analysis 
We performed 538 trials of the simulation baseline. We then modified the 
baseline parameters to cause the simulated detection sensor to operate in continuous 
scanning mode of operation. This parameter change is shown in the highlighted section of 
Table 5.1. Results comparing the two treatments are shown in Table 5.2. Table 3 shows 
two-sample t-test statistics we ran to compare sample means from the two treatments. 
Our expectations are that both sets of trials should have statistically equal attack arrival 
means, but that we would observe a statistically significant performance gain when 
changing sensor scan modes from Pan Then Scan to Continuous. 
Table 5.2. Comparison of Scenario 1 Treatment Results (n = 538). 
Comparison Result Treatment I Treatment II Delta 
Total Attacks Conducted 2736 2711 -25 
Total Attacks Detected 394 858 464 
Observed Attack Mean 5.09 5.04 
 Observed Detection Mean 0.73 1.59 0.86 
Detection Percentage 14.40% 31.65% 17.25% 
 
136 
 
 
Table 5.3. Two Sample t-Test Results for Observed Attack and Observed Detection Means. 
 
Observed Attack Mean Observed Detections 
t-Stat 0.34 10.54 
t-Critical 1.96 1.96 
 
Our results show that between the two trials of 538 runs each, there were 25 fewer 
attacks in the second trial. Even though there were marginally fewer attacks, there was an 
increase of 17.25% in the rate of detection for the CONTINUOUS mode of detection 
scanning, versus the PAN_THEN_SCAN mode of detection scanning. The t-statistic far 
exceeds the critical value set for the detection mean comparison study, allowing us to 
safely conclude that the CONTINOUS mode of operation represents a statistically 
meaningful performance improvement. This means that our real world sensor would 
benefit from engineering improvements decreasing motor noise on the power bus 
sufficient to allow for continuous scan operation.  
Still even after enabling continuous detection scanning, a single sensor detecting 
only 31.65% of the total attacks conducted against the protected facility represents poor 
performance. Nearly 7 in 10 attacks still succeed against our hypothetical facility! We 
next turn to increasing the amount of sensors deployed about the facility, to assess 
whether there are significant performance gains when sensors become cooperative. 
Scenario 2 – Simulating a Network of Continuously Scanning Detection Sensors 
Continuing our previous track of research, we modified the initial conditions of 
our simulation model, adding four detection sensors to our facility. Adding four sensors 
increases the simultaneous coverage area for facility protection detection scheme, along 
with adding an additional powerful capability: if an attack is now detected by two or 
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more sensors, the system can then employ triangulation methods to precisely geo-locate 
the position of the attack origin. To reflect this capability enhancement, we add metrics 
recording geo-location events to all simulation analysis from this point forward. 
As in Scenario 1, this experiment has two treatments (Treatment I and Treatment 
II). The sensor configuration for each of the treatments is identical in this scenario; only 
the number of simulation sensors deployed is varied. In Treatment I, we deploy the single 
sensor, operating with continuous scan capabilities. In Treatment II we deploy 4 identical 
sensors, spatially arranging them to be located on the 4 corners of the of the simulated 
FUP rooftop. The simulation parameters for the experiment treatments are shown in 
Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Treatment Parameters for Scenario 2 Comparison Study. In Scenario 2 we wish to quantify 
whether there is a performance gain achieved when, instead of a single detection sensor, the detection 
system employs a cooperative network of detection sensor. The different scan modes are highlighted in 
yellow.  
Scenario Parameter Treatment I Treatment II 
Simulation Duration 1 Year 1 Year 
Simulation Runs 538 538 
Facility Mean Attacks Per Year 5 5 
Detection Sensors Deployed 1 4 
Detection Sensor RPM 6 6 
Detection Sensor Beamwidth 25 25 
Detection Sensor Scan Mode CONTINUOUS CONTINUOUS 
Detection Capability LINE_OF_BEARING LINE_OF_BEARING 
 
Results and Analysis 
We performed 538 trials with a 4 sensor network, operated using the Treatment II 
simulation parameters. For Treatment I, we borrowed the results from the single 
continuous sensor we simulated in Scenario 1. Results comparing the two sets of trials 
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are shown in Table 5.5. Table 5.6 shows two-sample t-test statistics we ran to compare 
sample means from the two treatments.  
Table 5.5. Comparison of Scenario 2 Treatment Results (n = 538). 
Comparison Result Treatment I Treatment II Delta 
Total Attacks Conducted 2711 2698 -13 
Total Attacks Detection Only 858 1682 824 
Total Attacks Geo-Located 0 878 878 
Total Attacks Undetected 1853 1016 -837 
Observed Attack Mean 5.04 5.01 -0.03 
Observed Detection Mean 1.59 3.13 1.54 
Detection Percentage 31.65% 62.34% 30.69% 
 
Table 5.6. Two Sample t-Test Results for Observed Attack and Detection Means. 
 
Observed Attack Mean Observed Detections 
t-Stat 0.18 12.99 
t-Critical 1.96 1.96 
 
Scenario 3 – Simulating Line-of-Sight Detection Behavior 
At this point in the simulations, the detection sensors deployed atop the facility 
operated without any line-of-sight (LOS) considerations. For example, if an attacker were 
located near the east side of the facility, any sensor operating on the west side of the 
facility was permitted to detect this attack. In Scenario 3, we seek to add further realism 
to the sensor behaviors by placing line-of-sight constrains on the simulation attack 
detection logic. This is shown in Figure 5.8. In Figure 5.8.a and Figure 5.8.b we show 
how the facility itself creates effective blind-spots for detection sensors. These blind 
spots result from the nature of the building materials used in the typical office or 
laboratory complex, which are known to severely reflect, impede, or attenuate RF 
transmissions.  
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Figure 5.8. Elevation Model for the Facility Under Protection. In Figure 5.8.a, a detection sensor has clear 
line-of-sight to detect and scan for targets even in close proximity to the FUP. In Figure 5.8.b, a detection 
sensor has its scanning field of view obstructed by the facility structure. This serves as a dead-zone for our 
detection sensor scanning path.  
To model line-of-sight detection requirements, we implemented geometry 
processing rules in the simulation software requiring that any line segment, drawn 
between the origin point of a wireless attack and any sensor detecting the attack, may not 
have any common intersection with the polygon representing the facility footprint. If an 
intersection with the facility perimeter is found, the detection is declared invalid, since 
the sensor does not have clear line-of-sight to the emitter target. These rules are direct 
result of our field testing; our prototype did not perform well without direct line-of-sight 
to an RF target. 
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Detection Sensor Performance with Line-of-Sight Rules 
We first sought to quantify the impact that modeling line-of-sight performance 
would have on system detection capabilities. We designed a simple set of treatments, 
Treatment I featured a sensor operating without LOS constraints, while Treatment II 
operated with LOS constraints. The treatments and the simulation parameters are shown 
in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7. Treatment Parameters for Testing Non-LOS and LOS Simulation Rules. 
Scenario Parameter Treatment I Treatment II 
Simulation Duration 1 Year 1 Year 
Simulation Runs 538 538 
Facility Mean Attacks Per Year 5 5 
Detection Sensors Deployed 4 4 
Detection Sensor RPM 6 6 
Detection Sensor Beamwidth 25 25 
Detection Sensor Uses LOS NO YES 
Deployment Position FACILITY FACILITY 
 
We ran 538 trials of each treatment configuration. The results are shown in Table 
5.8.  Table 5.9 shows the t-test results performed on the treatment means.  
Table 5.8. Comparison of Line-Of-Sight Treatment Results (n = 538). 
Comparison Result Treatment I Treatment II 
Total Attacks Conducted 2698 2819 
Total Attacks Detection Only 1682 1491 
Total Attacks Geo-Located 878 584 
Total Attacks Undetected 1016 1328 
Observed Attack Mean 5.01 5.24 
Observed Detection Mean 3.13 2.77 
Observed Geo-Location Mean 1.63 1.09 
Detection Percentage 62.34% 52.86% 
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Table 5.9.  Pairwise t-test Results Between Treatment Means. 
 Observed Attack Mean Observed Detections Observed Geo-Locations 
t-Stat 1.40 2.62 4.8703 
t-Critical 1.96 1.96 1.9622 
 
Our study revealed that both the mean number of attacks detected and the mean 
number of attacks geo-located were sharply impacted by the implementation of line-of-
sight rules in the simulation. We hypothesized that attack detections would be affected by 
this change.  
Selecting a Detection Scanning Scheme Under Line-of-Sight Rules. 
Given that our simulation model now featured the ability to include FUP 
geometry impacts on LOS in system trials, we next turned our focus towards designing 
experiments which could test various scan pattern and sensor placement schemes. This 
gave rise to a series of research questions: Since vast areas of the facility grounds were 
now invisible to a detection sensor – due to detections being blocked by the facility itself 
– was it better to place the sensors a distance away from the facility, e.g. by mounting 
them high atop mast towers? Or, could a performance increase be obtained if sensors 
were programmed to scan a limited rotation sweep arc instead, to avoid scanning areas 
where the sensors lacks LOS? 
To explore these questions we selected three treatments for trialing in our 
simulation tool (Treatment I, Treatment II, and Treatment III). Treatment I is the same 
sensor scheme we have been operating in prior scenarios – 4 sensors concealed on the 
rooftop of the FUP – only these sensors now integrated line-of-sight detection rules. We 
added this Treatment for experiment control purposes. We wanted a baseline to compare 
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other treatment results. We were interested in relative differences from the baseline 
control value.  
For Treatment II, the sensors remained deployed on the facility rooftop; however 
we programmed the simulation such that the rotation path of each detection sensor was 
constrained to only sweep out 270° of a full circular arc, as shown in Figure 5.9. We 
hypothesized that programming the detection sensor to avoid scanning along azimuth 
lines where no line-of-sight existed would be a more efficient use of the detection sensor, 
when compared with the continuous scanning sensor scheme used in Treatment I.  
 
 
Figure 5.9. Constraining Detection Sensor Sweep Patterns to Avoid Dead-Zone Areas having Zero Line-of-
Sight. 
In Treatment III, we re-located the detection sensors to be mounted on mast 
towers located a distance away from the FUP. We selected 50 meters as the location 
offset. The sensors were programmed for continuous rotation, similar to Treatment I. 
Line-of-sight rules still applied to these sensors; however, we hypothesized that sensors 
deployed away from the facility would have a broader area of detection coverage, 
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providing better detection performance. A screen capture of a simulation running with 
sensors deployed on masts is shown in Figure 5.10. The parameters for each treatment are 
summarized in Table 5.10. 
 
 
Figure 5.10. A Simulation Trial Running with Detection Sensors Deployed on Masts about the FUP. 
 
Table 5.10. Treatment Parameters for Testing Three Different Sensor Detection Scanning Schemes. 
Scenario Parameter Treatment I Treatment II Treatment III 
Simulation Duration 1 Year 1 Year 1 Year 
Simulation Runs 538 538 538 
Facility Mean Attacks Per Year 5 5 5 
Detection Sensors Deployed 4 4 4 
Detection Sensor RPM 6 6 6 
Detection Sensor Beamwidth 25 25 25 
Detection Sensor Scan Mode CONTINUOUS ZONE SWEEP CONTINUOUS 
Deployment Position FACILITY FACILITY MAST 
144 
 
 
Results and Analysis 
We ran simulation runs with 538 trials for each of the treatments. Table 5.11 
shows results comparing the three separate treatments. The results from pairwise t-tests 
between all treatment combinations are shown in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.11. Comparison Results from Simulations using Three Different Detection Scanning Treatments. 
Comparison Result Treatment I Treatment II Treatment III 
Total Attacks Conducted 2819 2646 2759 
Total Attacks Detection Only 1491 1700 1519 
Total Attacks Geo-Located 584 584 759 
Total Attacks Undetected 1328 946 1240 
Observed Attack Mean 5.24 4.92 5.13 
Observed Detection Mean 2.77 3.16 2.82 
Observed Geo-Location Mean 1.09 1.09 1.41 
Detection Percentage 52.86% 64.23% 54.97% 
 
Table 5.12. Pairwise t-test results between treatment means.  
  Attacks Detections Geo Locations 
Treatment Pair t-Stat t-Critical t-Stat t-Critical t-Stat t-Critical 
I with II 1.98 1.96 2.88 1.96 0.00 1.96 
I with III 0.65 1.96 0.38 1.96 2.93 1.96 
II with III 1.39 1.96 2.57 1.96 3.04 1.96 
 
In this scenario context, our results are somewhat inconclusive. Data did indicate 
that Treatment II, which employed a detection scanning scheme avoiding unnecessary 
movements through areas where no LOS existed, did yield a significant increase in 
detections (14% more detections, t = 2.88/2.57; t-critical = 1.96) versus the Treatment I 
scheme employing continuous scans following a complete rotation arc.  
However, results also indicated that the Treatment III scheme, which deployed 
sensors atop masts at a distance away from the FUP, also yielded significantly higher 
geo-located attack detections (30%, t = 2.93/3/04; t-critical = 1.96) when compared to 
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both Treatments I and II. We should emphasize that, while the pairwise analysis results 
are mixed, the Treatment III results should be given more important consideration due to 
the design objective of our system to not only detect, but actually interdict attacks. The 
significant increase in spatial geo-location percentage provided by Treatment III offers 
FUP security personnel the ability to not only detect attacks, but also launch search and 
seizure countermeasures against the adversary.  
Faced with these mixed results and given the importance we assign to attack 
spatial attribution, we conclude that a scheme employing a mast mounted sensor 
deployment strategy provides the most impact in terms of system performance. The 30% 
gain in geo-locations of Treatment III offsets the smaller 14% gain in detections achieved 
with the Treatment II scheme, which follows the constrained sweep pattern. 
Still, given the data presented so far, geo-location rates remain far too low for our 
system to be practical in a real setting. Geo-locating 759 attacks out of the 2759 
conducted in the Treatment III simulation trials indicates that our system is only spatially 
attributing a low percentage of all attacks conducted against the FUP (only 27.5% of 
attacks were geo-located in the Treatment III trials).  
We next explore a scheme designed to significantly increase the spatial attribution 
capabilities, even when adhering to the low speed mechanical steering constraints 
imposed by simulations mimicking the low (6 RPM) rotation scan capabilities of our real 
world prototype design. 
Scenario 4 – Simulating WLAN Data Rate Modulation to Slow Attack Progression 
We modeled our next strategy consideration off of those older movies and 
television shows where the police detective attempts to run a telephone call trace on a 
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suspect and must keep the target talking on the line long enough for the trace to complete. 
Following a similar approach, we modified the simulated command and control system of 
the detection network to have the capability to lower the overall data rate of the WLAN 
environment, whenever an active attack is detected. For example, an attack might be 
launched using WLAN hardware supporting 100Mbps, but once any sensor in our system 
detects such an attack in progress, the command and control system can begin modulating 
the data rate of the system Wireless Access Point (WAP). This is depicted in Figure 5.11 
 
Figure 5.11. Placing the Wireless Access Point Data Rate Under Control of the Detection Command and 
Control Sub-System. In this scenario, the Command and Control system can throttle the facility Wireless 
Access Point data rate. The scenario assumes a honey-pot or honey-net situation, where data are made 
available for download, but when an active download attempt is detected, the Command and Control 
System dynamically modifies the data rate to be slower, thus stretching the attack duration with the aim of 
increasing the chances of successfully geo-locating the adversary. 
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In our simulation trials, we designed two treatments (Treatment I, and Treatment 
II). In Treatment I we operated the WLAN environment as we have been in all prior 
scenarios, with an average attacker WLAN data rate of 100Mbps, and an average FUP 
WAP data rate of 50Mbps. In Treatment II, we programmed the command and control 
system to drop WLAN data rates to 5Mbps whenever adversary activity was detected, 
from whatever the current high speed rate was before any attack was detected.  
We hypothesized that a lowered the data rate will allow even a low-speed 
mechanically steered system more effective scan time, increasing the odds that more than 
one detection system sensor lobes the active emitter, enabling geo-location methods to be 
performed. In this way our system can mimic the “keep them talking longer” methods we 
discussed earlier. Table 5.13. shows the treatment parameters we used during simulation 
trials. 
Table 5.13. Treatment Parameters for Normal Data Rate and Modulated Low Speed Data Rate. 
Scenario Parameter Treatment I Treatment II 
Simulation Duration 1 Year 1 Year 
Simulation Runs 538 247 
Facility Mean Attacks Per Year 5 5 
Mean Adversary Skill Level NATION_STATE NATION_STATE 
Detection Sensors Deployed 4 4 
Detection Sensor RPM 6 6 
Detection Sensor Beamwidth 25 25 
Detection Sensor Scan Mode CONTINUOUS_NORM_DATA_RATE CONTINUOUS_LOW_DATA_RATE 
Deployment Position FACILITY FACILITY 
 
Data Rate Modulation: Keen Strategy or Pure Folly? 
Before presenting our simulation results we feel it is important to discuss the 
merits of modulating the data rate when an active attack against the FUP is detected by 
our system. When consideration is being given whether or not to provide a data rate 
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modulation capability to the WLAN environment operated within proximity to the FUP, 
one should also consider whether is it more advantageous to instead provide the 
capability to simply halt any WLAN operations whenever unauthorized WLAN activity 
is detected by the sensor network. We call this the Halting mode of operation. Under the 
Halting mode of operation, sensors would sacrifice any ability to geo-locate an active 
emitter, since WLAN operations are immediately disabled upon attack detection. Indeed 
when the prevention of data exfiltration of any sort attains a higher priority than capturing 
or revealing the location of an attacker, then the Halting mode of operation should be 
preferred.  
That being stated, one real set of circumstances where lowering the data rate of 
the WLAN would be desirable, even a key part of a highly effective detection system 
strategy, would be in a honey-netting environment [5] [6]. In those situations, we have 
deliberately set out to lure an adversary to conduct wireless attacks against an 
intentionally made vulnerable WAP with the objective of monitoring the tradecraft being 
employed by the adversary or, as in the context of our spatially enabled detection system, 
we seek to capture the adversary when she is in the act of perpetrating her attack. We feel 
the honey-netting context provides the most supportive rationale for employing the 
lowered data rate strategy, in place of the simpler and less risky Halting Strategy.  
Results and Analysis 
We performed simulation runs of 538, and 247 trials each using the respective 
treatment parameters listed in Table 5.13. We ran fewer trials for Treatment II only 
because a software design peculiarity inherent to the simulation software implementation 
meant that simulating the extremely low data rates in the modulated data rate trials 
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caused our simulations to run significantly slower than the high data rate trials. A 
comparison of treatment results is shown in Table 5.14.  Table 5.15 shows the results of 
pairwise t-tests we performed against mean observed attacks, observed detections, and 
observed geo-location simulation results. 
Table 5.14. Comparison of Simulation Results using Two Different WLAN Data Rate Treatments. 
Comparison Result Treatment I Treatment II 
Total Attacks Conducted 2819 1253 
Total Attacks Detection Only 1491 1224 
Total Attacks Geo-Located 584 1175 
Total Attacks Undetected 1328 29 
Observed Attack Mean 5.24 5.03 
Observed Detection Mean 2.77 4.92 
Observed Geo-Location Mean 1.09 4.72 
Detection Percentage 52.86% 97.69% 
 
Table 5.15. Pairwise t-test Results Between Treatment Means.  
 
Observed Attack Mean Observed Detections Observed Geo-Locations 
t-Stat 1.08 12.10 21.21 
t-Critical 1.96 1.96 1.97 
 
Significantly increased detection and geo-location rates (97.6% and 93.8%) were 
observed in the Treatment II trials, where the detection system command and control was 
able to reduce WLAN data rate at the instant an attack was first detected. We concluded 
that this behavior is a powerful weapon to include in the protection strategy of our 
detection system. Indeed enabling this capability yielded the most desirable results 
observed in simulations so far, towards an effective strategy capable of detecting and 
defeating the vast majority, in terms of raw numbers, of attacks launched against the 
FUP.  
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We next turn to a study of geo-location performance and the capabilities of the 
detection system to accurately and precisely estimate the position coordinates of any 
attack lobed by more than one detection sensor. 
Scenario 5 - Simulating Detection System Position Estimation Error 
Having explored various strategies for sensor placement on and about the facility, 
as well as examining sweep-pattern control, and honey-netting schemes, we lastly turn to 
an analysis of sensor position error estimates. We first describe the concept of error in the 
position estimates output by our detection system. We show that the position estimate is 
dependent upon the boresight error of each simulated detection sensor, which impacts the 
accuracy of the LOB calculated by each sensor. We then present a randomized, time 
dependent process which dynamically models the boresight error of each simulated 
detection sensor. Finally, we apply three different boresight error treatments to simulation 
runs integrating this model, and discuss the detection performance impact that 
randomized sensor boresight error has on position estimation outputs of the detection 
system.  
The Concept of Position Estimation Error 
When a sensor in our system detects an attack, the sensor calculates a LOB for the 
detected emitter. Logically, the LOB can be represented as a line segment, with origin at 
the detection sensor, and termination at the emitter. When two or more sensors detect the 
same emitter, triangulation techniques permit us to estimate the sensor position. Think of 
this as the finding the coordinates of the single point where the two equations describing 
the LOB line segments intersect. In practice a real detection sensor is not going to possess 
laser-like, straight line accuracy; there is a boresight error impacting the detection sensor 
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LOB calculation. This results in the LOB becoming a pie-shaped wedge, instead of a 
linear vector. Furthermore, where two wedges representing separate device LOB 
estimates intersect, the position estimate for the triangulated emitter becomes a region as 
well. We define this region as the Position Estimate, i.e. the region where the detection 
sensor network estimates that the attack is originating from. This is illustrated in Figure 
5.12 
 
Figure 5.12. Conceptual Model of Detection Sensor Position Estimate. In Figure 5.12.a, two sensors are 
shown lobing an active attack. The yellow colored bands in the center of each detection beam correspond to 
the simulated mean boresight error – the actual emitter LOB error is somewhere in this band. Antenna A 
and Antenna B both have independent and time-varying boresight errors (θEA and θEB). Figure 5.12.b 
depicts a close-in representation showing the region where the two LOB error band polygons intersect. This 
is the Position Estimate for the detection system. 
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Modeling Boresight Estimation Error Using a Randomized Process 
As shown in Figure 5.12, simulation detection sensors do not operate with 
constant boresight errors. This is due to non-linearities inherent to RF propagation. To 
model this behavior, we implemented a random process within the simulation which 
outputs a new boresight error for each detection sensor at each simulation time increment. 
Figure 5.13 features a block diagram describing the randomized boresight error process.  
 
Figure 5.13. Randomized Boresight Error Estimation Process. A PRNG is shown generating a probability 
value which is input to the inverse Gaussian CDF. The result is a z* statistic representing the normalized 
Gaussian mean for that probability. The normalized mean is then scaled and shifted by the model 
parameters for Mean Boresight Error and Mean Boresight Standard Deviation. This is the simulation 
Current Boresight Error which is assigned to a detection sensor for one simulation time slot. 
As is shown in the figure, a probability value is generated by a pseudo-random 
number generator (PRNG). In our implementation, this is a single-precision, floating-
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point value between 0 and 1. We input the probability into a routine performing an 
inverse-lookup of a corresponding mean value from the Cumulative Distribution 
Function of the Gaussian Normal Distribution. The routine returns a normalized z* value 
(μ=0; σ=1), which is then scaled and shifted to align with the mean and standard 
deviation parameters input into the simulation model at startup. We call this result the 
Mean Boresight Error (MBE). The MBE for each detection sensor is updated at each 
simulation time instant – the value varies constantly with simulation time about the preset 
mean, and is independently generated for each sensor. 
The equation for the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the Gaussian 
Normal Distribution appears in Equation 2. No closed form solution exists for the CDF of 
the Gaussian Normal Distribution; instead we selected a numerical approximation from 
here [7] and integrated source-code for the algorithm directly into the simulation module.  
 
(2) 
We sanity checked the algorithm output using the Norm.Inv() function in 
Microsoft Excel to verify the numerical approximation from the algorithm 
implementation exactly matched the approximations output by Excel. Results from this 
function, and results from our algorithm implementation were numerically identical. This 
provided us confidence in our implementation, but more importantly we no longer 
needed to rely on a table of z-values to generate randomized means, something we 
wished to avoid in order to provide greater precision to our simulation process.  
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Applying the Randomized Model to Simulation Detection Sensors 
We next programmed each simulated detection sensor to have a time dependent 
boresight error which randomly varied the accuracy of the LOB estimate calculated by 
the sensor. This resulted in the LOB estimates becoming the wedge shaped polygons we 
described in Figure 5.12. The point of the wedge corresponded to the position of the 
sensor, and the angle spanned between the left and right edges of the wedge corresponded 
to the random error mean generated by the boresight error model. Field tests using our 
sensor prototype against RF targets with known headings behaved exactly in the same 
manner; LOB values for these targets fell in a range having a mean, and standard error, 
with the true mean falling within a confidence interval based on the standard error and 
number of samples in our estimate [2].  
Any attack that was sensed by a single sensor could then be spatially attributed to 
the wedge-shaped polygonal region determined by the random boresight error that the 
sensor was operating with at the time of attack detection. When two or more sensors were 
able to lobe an attack, the resulting wedges from each sensor LOB could then be 
intersected to form the Position Estimate. To perform polygon intersection and polygon 
area calculations in a computationally efficient manner in our simulation runs, we 
implemented 2-D polygon intersection algorithms based on the computational geometry 
tools described here [8]. The calculated area of the position estimate region is a key 
performance metric in our experiments – allowing us to compare simulation runs with 
different detection sensor Mean Boresight Error treatments.  
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Selecting Mean Boresight Error Treatments for Simulation Runs 
The MBE for each sensor was then normally distributed and model driven using 
our random process. This permitted each detection sensor to simulate position estimation 
errors that were parametrically driven by configuration values for mean (μ) and standard 
deviation (σ). We only needed to initialize our simulation detection sensors with 
boresight error mean and boresight error standard deviation values that we were 
interested in testing in our simulation experiments. These configuration values were input 
at simulation startup. Each simulation run was performed using differing treatments, with 
respect to MBE μ and σ configuration values. We arrived at the individual MBE 
treatments by averaging boresight errors measured during actual field tests of our 
prototype detection sensor. Four treatments using different mean boresight error statistics 
are shown in Table 5.16.  
Table 5.16. Four Different Mean Boresight Error Treatments Obtained from Detection Sensor Field Tests. 
Treatment Boresight Mean Error Boresight Std Dev 
I - Sequential Lobing -16.70° 4.35° 
II - Monopulse I -1.41° 0.81° 
III - Monopulse II (Best) 0.98° 1.22° 
IV - Monopulse II (Worst) 2.56° 1.12° 
 
Treatment I configures the detection sensors with the large mean boresight error 
we observed when using our field prototype in a sequential lobing single antenna 
configuration. All of the remaining treatments are configured with values taken from the 
monopulse configuration of the detection sensor we fielded. They differ only in the 
software monopulse processing detector that was used to detect emitter activity, and 
perform monopulse LOB estimate calculations. Treatment II uses a boresight error mean 
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value resulting from a Peak Variance detector. Treatments III and IV both use a Matched 
Filter detector, but since this detector featured a significantly wider boresight error 
variance, relative to the Treatment II detector, we chose to simulate the best and worst 
case boresight error values, so that we could ascertain how sensitive position estimate 
was to each error measurement. For an in-depth technical discussion of the how we 
arrived at these treatment parameters, see [2]. 
Discussion of Simulation Run Results 
We ran simulation runs using each of the treatment parameters, stopping each 
simulation when 1000 geo-located detections were logged. A side-by-side comparison of 
results is shown in Table 5.17.  The Position Estimate Error for each treatment is 
highlighted in the table. ANOVA and pairwise analysis indicate that all of the position 
error means are significantly different from the other. The first two rows of the table 
show the sample boresight error mean and standard deviation, which closely matched that 
of the parameters we input to the randomized lookup module of the simulation. This was 
expected and served as a sanity check on the data we collected from the simulation.  
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Table 5.17. Summary of Simulation Results using Different Mean Boresight Error Treatments. 
 
Treatment I Treatment II Treatment III Treatment IV 
Sample Boresight Mean Error (deg) -16.59 -1.41 0.95 2.56 
Sample Boresight Std Dev (deg) 4.35 0.80 1.20 1.13 
Position Estimate Area Mean (sq ft) 7714.56 67.38 38.76 205.09 
Postion Estimage Area Std Dev (sq ft) 8529.25 246.21 132.99 603.57 
Position Estimate CI 528.64 15.26 8.24 37.41 
Mean + CI 8243.20 82.64 47.01 242.50 
Mean - CI 7185.92 52.13 30.52 167.68 
Attack Distance Mean 132.29 128.77 134.34 130.61 
Attack Distance Std Dev 54.64 54.75 54.78 52.94 
Attack Distance Min 283.23 281.06 284.71 281.059 
Attack Distance Max 6.43 10.01 11.12 10.94 
 
Does the Detection System Produce Actionable Threat Intelligence? 
In [1] we detailed the threat model and environmental landscape that would make 
attacks staged and launched externally to the FUP viable attack vectors. We described the 
Parking Lot Attack and commented that an adversary would most likely camouflage her 
attack such that it would be visually difficult to detect using surveillance methods alone. 
Our system was designed to counter this attack vector, by providing actionable threat 
intelligence that would permit facility security personnel to narrow the geographic source 
of any detected threats to a spatial area that was rapidly searchable. For example, we 
think that narrowing a suspected attack source to only 1 or 2 target vehicles, instead of 
searching all the vehicles that could potentially be located in a research lab or office 
parking lot would represent reasonable actionable threat intelligence.  
To assess whether our detection system could meet the challenge presented by 
such a narrow search area size, we selected a target vehicle footprint of 52 square feet, 
based on a U.S. government vehicle size report found here [9]. We then plotted the 
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Position Estimate regions shown in Table 5.17 so that we could visually inspect each area 
relative to one another. Figure 5.14 shows the plotted results.  
 
Figure 5.14.Relative Footprint Sizes Derived from Study Position Estimation Errors.  
In the figure, it can be clearly seen that the Position Estimate for results obtained 
from the sequential lobing (Treatment I) target tracking scheme – about 7700 square feet 
– would most likely be unacceptable in terms of actionable threat intelligence, although 
this region is still smaller than the typical sub-urban house lot, and is several orders of 
magnitude smaller than the entire external vicinity of the FUP we used in our simulation, 
which comprised 150,000 square feet.  
Both Treatment II and Treatment III produced Position Estimate results well 
within the bounds of our one or two vehicle search region requirement we imposed as a 
reasonable search area expectation. Even the 205 square foot zone produced by the 
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Treatment IV Position Estimate – about 4 vehicles – could be arguably called reasonable, 
depending on the nature of the threat environment and the risk imposed by any successful 
attack.  
We conclude that each of the estimation treatments do result in a substantial 
narrowing of the zone that would need to be searched to find and locate any unauthorized 
transmitter detected by our system. The monopulse methods operate very near the 
performance threshold we set for our system, showing promising results that encourage 
us to continue further research into our detection system. 
Research Conclusions 
We presented a simulation tool capable of answering questions about how a 
network of cooperative mechanically-steered, monopulse-enabled detection sensors 
might protect a hypothetical facility from standoff externally launched wireless attacks. 
Our intention was to show that there are many types of questions that can arise during the 
course of determining what an effective strategy would be for device spatial deployment 
and operational considerations. It was not our intention for this work to be an exhaustive 
study of every minute operational detail.  Instead we wanted to emphasize the utility that 
simulations modeling can afford a designer of such a system.  
Using the simulation tools we developed we first were able to conclude that our 
prototype sensor, which employed a pan then scan mechanical steering scheme, would 
not be an effective detection sensor in a real environment. We also concluded that, even 
when the chassis was modified for continuous rotation, the sensor only achieved a 
simulated detection success rate of 65% and only a 13% geo-location rate, even after our 
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simulations increased the number of sensors operating in the detection network from 1 to 
4.  
We increased the simulation realism by incorporating line-of-sight detection rules 
into the simulation model, and then ran scenarios where we tested the effectiveness of a 
zone sensor sweep patterns versus simple continuous sensor rotation and deployment of 
sensor on mast towers instead of the facility roof top. We concluded that sensor scan 
sweeps increases operational effectiveness, but overlapping scan zones on masts situated 
away from the actual facility offer even better performance in terms of effective spatial 
attribution. Furthermore, maintaining the continuous rotation mode of operation, instead 
of an oscillating back and forth scan arc is a simpler scheme requiring less complex 
mechanical control. 
We showed that permitting the detection system command and control logic to 
intentionally degrade the WLAN data rate during an active attack offers significant 
benefits in terms of both detection percentage and geo-spatial attribution. This technique 
would be especially relevant in a honey-netting context, where permitting the sensor to 
throttle WAP data rate to maintain longer sessions with a lured adversary would be 
highly desirable.  
Finally, we concluded that simulation trials configured with mean boresight errors 
obtained from actual device field tests indicate that position estimate error regions 
provide significant reductions in the search space, and that the monopulse boresight error 
estimates featured regions with areas comparable to the footprints we presented for the 
average vehicle. We found these results promising and we intend to further pursue 
research questions in the domain of wireless intrusion detection and spatial attribution. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
Results and Conclusions 
We presented the design and architecture for an integrated network of cooperative 
mechanically steered sensors designed to detect and spatially attribute RF targets 
operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band. It was our intention to deploy this sensor platform to 
defend a facility against an adversary employing the Parking Lot Attack as a vector for 
information system compromise and data exfiltration. 
The primary finding of this work is that the utility of such a detection system does 
indeed show promise, provided that the environment about the facility under protection 
can be conditioned for the proper line-of-sight characteristics that we were able to 
demonstrate during our own controlled field tests. Results we obtained from tests using 
both a prototype detection sensor and simulation studies show that the region of 
estimated position error calculated by this type of detection system yields a perimeter that 
can be easily searched and policed by a counter intrusion team, at least for the relatively 
close proximity detection zones surveyed and simulated for our research. Additionally, 
monopulse radar methods, which led to us to incorporate an antenna array into our sensor 
architecture, enabled us to show that these techniques can outperform less sophisticated 
schemes, where only a sequentially-lobing single directional antenna is employed for 
detection. 
Recommendations for the Direction of Additional Research 
Developments in software defined radio (SDR) have made possible exciting new 
possibilities in this research domain. Where our present research prototype could only 
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sample a single 333kHz 2.4 GHz ISM band channel, platforms such as the HackRF or the 
Ettus Research USRP device permit wide band monopulse detectors to be created entirely 
within software. These tools, when coupled with software radio development 
environments such as GNU Radio, would permit much more flexibility in terms of 
prototype design, capabilities, and device sensitivity. We recommend that any future 
studies explore the capabilities of these platforms and tools. Furthermore, these 
technologies permit detection sensor designs that are much smaller in terms of physical 
size, to the point where it is entirely feasible to deploy a monopulse sensor on a mobile 
and autonomous drone. We also recommend continued research involving studies where 
a single or cooperative network of drone mounted detection sensors would be employed 
for facility wireless attack detection and prevention. Whether these platforms would 
augment a fixed network of mechanically steered – sensors similar to those presented in 
this research – or whether they provide the situational awareness capabilities to necessary 
to independently defend a facility remains an interesting research question from a 
theoretical, simulation, and real hardware prototyping perspective.  
 
 
